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When someone calls a dog a cow and then seeks a subsidy pro-
vided by statute for cows, the obvious response is that this is not 
what the statute means. It may also happen that rich people 
who would not otherwise have cows buy them to gain cow subsi-
dies. Here, when people say (as they do) that this is not what the 
statute means, they are in fact saying something quite different.1 
  INTRODUCTION   
In an idealized (and naïve) view of the modern regulatory 
state, Congress enacts laws setting policies, resolving problems, 
and achieving goals that reflect a broad social consensus. Gov-
ernment agencies and courts work diligently to implement 
those laws and effectuate congressional purposes.2 Citizens can 
readily determine what the law requires of them and generally 
follow those requirements; those who do not comply with the 
law are worthy of disapproval and punishment.  
Of course, such a simple picture scarcely captures how 
most laws actually work. Congress adopts regulatory statutes 
that are complicated, ambiguous, and sometimes incomplete, 
and that delegate tremendous power to administrative agencies 
to resolve the ambiguities and fill in the gaps.3 Agencies interp-
                                                                                    
 1. Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 859, 865 (1982). 
 2. This view of the relationship between congressional statutes and 
agency implementation thereof was in vogue about one hundred years ago but 
has long since been dismissed by scholars as unrealistic. See, e.g., Elena Ka-
gan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2253 (2001) (de-
scribing the transmission belt theory of the administrative state and subse-
quent scholarly rejection of that theory); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation 
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1675 (1975) (same). 
The conception of the courts as faithful agents of Congress interpreting sta-
tutes to effectuate congressional purposes, also historically based, retains at 
least some currency. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the 
Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11–22 (2001) (documenting the conception of 
judges charged with interpreting legislation as faithful agents of Congress). 
 3. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRE-
TATION 48 (1994) (describing statutory enactments as “often general, abstract, 
and theoretical”); see also MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE 
WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 39–47 (2d ed. 1989) (contending that Congress 
has an incentive to adopt legislative programs and expand the federal bureau-
cracy to increase opportunities to help constituents resolve bureaucratic prob-
lems and thereby gain support for their own reelection efforts); Daniel B. Rod-
riguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political Advantage, 12 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 217, 218–20 (1992) (listing several reasons why statutes “contain vex-
ing gaps, gray areas, and opaque language,” including achieving legislative 
compromise, satisfying interest groups with competing interests, and accom-
modating changing preferences, as well as drafting difficulties and errors); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 
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ret, supplement, and expand statutory mandates through an 
extensive body of agency-generated regulations, rulings, adju-
dications, and informal actions which themselves are often 
complicated and ambiguous.4 The actions required for regu-
lated parties to comply with these laws are anything but 
straightforward.5 Indeed, a regulated party may genuinely be-
lieve it is complying, only to have the government disagree.6 Of 
course, all laws grapple with ambiguity and compliance issues.7 
Yet these problems seem to threaten the efficacy and legitima-
cy of regulatory regimes more fundamentally than other types 
of law, and of some regulatory regimes more than others.8 Why 
might this be? This is the question that animates this Article. 
Regulatory laws differ from other types of law in at least 
two important respects.9 First, regulatory regimes are typically 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
1741 (1995) (observing that legislators may reach agreement regarding “the 
meaning, authority, and soundness of a governing legal provision in the face of 
disagreements about much else”).  
 4. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 2, at 1676–77 (noting that statutes 
which delegate broad discretionary powers to agencies run counter to the 
“transmission belt” theory of administrative law). 
 5. See Steven Kelman, Enforcement of Occupational Safety and Health 
Regulations, in ENFORCING REGULATION 97, 103 (Keith Hawkins & John M. 
Thomas eds., 1984) (“Perhaps the most unfortunate results come when legal 
requirements actually interfere with compliance because they make regula-
tions so hard to understand.”). 
 6. See discussion infra note 21 (noting that even efforts to comply max-
imally with regulatory requirements may lead to interpretive disagreements 
and litigation between regulators and regulated parties). 
 7. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 218 (observing that, even where 
statutory requirements are not particularly ambiguous, lawyers will still 
“manufacture” ambiguity in attempting to persuade courts to interpret sta-
tutes in their clients’ interests). 
 8. Of course, concepts such as efficacy and legitimacy are complex and 
nuanced, and the literature discussing them as regards the law is voluminous. 
See generally, e.g., JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 125–33, 259–66 (1978); 
JOHN H. SCHAAR, LEGITIMACY IN THE MODERN STATE 15–44 (1981); TOM R. 
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19–39 (2006); 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY 
AND SOCIETY 212–99 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff 
et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitima-
cy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794–95 (2005). For the pur-
poses of this Article, intuitive and rather crude concepts suffice. 
 9. The distinction between regulatory laws and other laws is difficult to 
pinpoint precisely. Henry Friendly described regulatory law as encompassing: 
the entire range of action by government with respect to the citizen or 
by the citizen with respect to the government, except for those mat-
ters dealt with by the criminal law and those left to private civil liti-
gation where the government’s only participation is in furnishing an 
impartial tribunal with the power of enforcement. 
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complicated and technical, both in their subject matter and in 
the programs they establish. Hence, they rely particularly 
heavily on terms of art, some of which have little or no meaning 
outside the law’s requirements. Second, parties whose activities 
are covered by government regulation typically spend consider-
able time planning their actions in view of the law. Some 
amount of planning is generally necessary to achieve com-
pliance with the law, and regulated parties who do not plan 
may be surprised to find their behavior at odds with legal re-
quirements. Yet planning also inevitably runs up against am-
biguity in statutory and regulatory meaning, and regulated 
parties may be able to choose between alternative plausible in-
terpretations. Some regulated parties are uncomfortable with 
the risk that they will be pursued for noncompliance and thus 
choose to comply maximally with statutes and regulations to 
lessen that risk. Many others are more comfortable with risk 
and therefore comply only minimally. Among minimal com-
pliers, some take aggressive positions while others are more 
cautious. Regulators react to minimal compliance by, among 
other things, fine-tuning the law. Regulated parties then adjust 
their behavior, but again not necessarily in ways that regula-
tors expect or want. We argue that, under certain circums-
tances, this repeated pushing and pulling at the boundaries of 
statutory and regulatory meaning may lead to a regime whose 
requirements and prohibitions can only be understood by de-
tailed reference to its history.  
Law is, of course, always a product of its history. Agencies 
and courts seeking to interpret statutory meaning routinely 
refer to the legislative history documenting the circumstances 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Henry J. Friendly, New Trends in Administrative Law, 6 MD. B.J., Apr. 1974, 
at 9, 9. Focusing more specifically on compliance, as we do here, Cento Velja-
novski observes that nonregulatory criminal offenses are “positive act[s]” and 
“discrete event[s]” that “redistribute and destroy wealth,” while regulatory 
offenses tend to be “byproducts of the pursuit of some otherwise socially bene-
ficial activity” that involve a “failure to act” and “a continuing state of affairs” 
and that “occur within an organization where the responsibilities for com-
pliance are often diffused.” Cento G. Veljanovski, The Economics of Regulatory 
Enforcement, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 5, at 171, 179. One can 
readily imagine scenarios that are clearly regulatory yet do not quite satisfy 
either of these conceptions. There may also be laws that seem to fall within 
these broad descriptions but that one nevertheless resists labeling as regulato-
ry when comparing them, for example, to the laws governing classic regulated 
industries like utilities and railroads. Nevertheless, together these definitions 
reflect common intuitions about the scope and nature of regulatory law, and 
we regard them as both close enough and consistent with the features of regu-
latory law that we consider particularly salient for purposes of this Article. 
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prompting legislative action and the compromises of the legis-
lative process. Agency and judicial precedent also play a prom-
inent role in understanding the law’s requirements and scope 
and guiding regulated party behavior. In referencing a regula-
tory regime’s history, however, we reach more broadly than just 
legislative history and precedent to encompass the full range of 
inputs that drive the law’s trajectory, including actions and 
reactions by legislators, regulators, courts, and regulated par-
ties as the law is applied and acted upon, as well as political 
and other like forces influencing the law and its coverage. 
For some regimes, history matters both more and different-
ly than for others. In some instances, the requirements and 
scope of a regulatory regime’s coverage are sufficiently atten-
uated from statutory text and purpose that they can only be 
explained or understood by reference to history; the regime is 
fundamentally historically contingent. At its (perhaps carica-
tured) extreme, such a regime is one in which regulated parties 
expend significant efforts attempting only the most minimal 
compliance, to the point that compliance is perceived as option-
al and, to some nontrivial extent, is indeed so. Some set of ac-
tivities the regime manages to sanction or constrain is per-
ceived as, and to some nontrivial extent is, unanchored to any 
reasonable conception of the regime’s purpose. Indeed, under 
such a regime, activities that might seem to warrant the same 
treatment are sometimes treated differently, and activities that 
might seem to warrant different treatment are treated the 
same. This happens frequently enough that the regime’s cover-
age is difficult to justify in any principled manner, compromis-
ing its efficacy and legitimacy.  
What does a regime that is so importantly shaped by its 
history (or, as we will sometimes call it, trajectory) look like, 
and how does a regime get to that state? In articulating its re-
quirements and prohibitions, law often starts with a prototype, 
a paradigmatic case of what it wants to regulate. There is a 
prohibition on doing X, and anything sufficiently like X, and 
the imposition of consequence Y for noncompliance. Ideally, 
where it is unclear whether particular actions are similar 
enough to X to warrant sanction, the interactions between re-
gulated parties, regulators, and other interested parties—
pushing, pulling, and testing the parameters of regulatory re-
quirements—would not only resolve those cases but also refine 
and elaborate the regime’s goals and means for achieving them. 
Sometimes, however, the trajectory goes awry, and the similar-
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ity assessment yields results that depart appreciably from any 
reasonable conception of the regime’s text or purpose. A subsidy 
that applies to cows, for example, is successfully extended to 
some dogs, and maybe sheep, pigs, and chickens as well.  
Compounding the difficulty further, law often emphasizes 
certainty and encourages planning by providing detailed road-
maps of necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving par-
ticular legal consequences. Turning again to the cow subsidy 
example, perhaps the statute awards the subsidy based upon 
the number of cows owned as of the end of the owner’s fiscal 
year, without further elaboration or qualification. In theory, 
two parties with different fiscal years could transfer ownership 
of the cow back and forth annually, so that each owns the cow 
as of the applicable measurement date. In other words, given 
rules that are susceptible to formalistic interpretation, a single 
cow may yield subsidies for more than one owner. 
This phenomenon is well known. In the debate over rules 
versus standards, scholars appropriately criticize rules for al-
lowing spirit-violative behavior that uses technical, formalistic 
readings to produce a result other than, and perhaps contrary 
to, what Congress or the implementing agency intended.10 Law 
typically seeks to avoid the potentially absurd extremes of rules 
or formalistic interpretations of statutory text through the use 
of ex post standards, which often take the form of what we call 
goal-derived categories. Yet, given the role of precedent and 
predictability, at a certain point, we may just be stuck with 
many non-cow cows or with multiple subsidies of a single cow. 
In a regime that relies strongly on its trajectory in articulating 
its requirements, many rules will permit considerable spirit-
violative behavior, the standards ostensibly available to ad-
dress such behavior will find themselves foreclosed, and the 
overall coverage of the regime will reflect its history far better 
than its substance and purpose.  
Our goal with this Article is a preliminary one: to describe 
a basic theory by which minimalist compliance and regulator 
reactions thereto may lead to a regime that is far better ex-
plained by its trajectory than by statutory or regulatory text or 
purpose. We thus intend this Article to serve as a foundation 
for future work in which we will elaborate the theory in more 
detail and apply it comparatively across a broad range of regu-
latory regimes such as tax, campaign finance, antitrust, envi-
                                                                                    
 10. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
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ronmental law, and securities law. Our account has potentially 
useful implications, perhaps helping to inform policy responses 
to difficulties that regulatory regimes typically encounter. In 
this regard, we note that in many areas, people’s reasons for 
complying with law can scarcely be purely instrumental. The 
law simply does not have the resources to pursue all plausible 
cases of less-than-full compliance. If people do not think a re-
gime is legitimate, evidence suggests they are far less likely to 
comply.11  
In the course of describing our theory, we often present the 
federal income tax laws as a polar case of a regulatory regime 
that notoriously struggles with both efficacy and legitimacy. 
Our ultimate goal is to identify factors that might adversely 
affect any regulatory regime’s efficacy and legitimacy.12 That 
being said, we note that there is some debate within the tax 
community over whether tax is an exceptional case, such that 
legal doctrines, principles, or observations common among oth-
er regulatory regimes simply cannot and should not apply simi-
larly in the tax context.13 One of us has publicly rejected argu-
                                                                                    
 11. See ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHA-
VIOUR 67 (2007) (“If a taxpayer believes that non-compliance is widespread 
and a socially accepted behaviour, then this taxpayer is more likely not to 
comply.”); TYLER, supra note 8, at 22–27 (linking compliance with perceptions 
of legitimacy and observing that “in democratic societies the legal system can-
not function if it can influence people only by manipulating rewards and 
costs”); Claire A. Hill, What Cognitive Psychologists Should Find Interesting 
About Tax, 17 PSYCHONOMICS BULL. & REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2010) (discuss-
ing the psychology literature on noncompliance in tax).  
 12. We make no normative claim that it is always bad to “harm” a regula-
tory regime. We acknowledge the argument that government ought to be chal-
lenged, and that the regulatory envelope should be pushed, as a needed coun-
terweight to the government’s power. The phenomenon we discuss in this Ar-
ticle concerns potential threats to regulatory regimes that go beyond such ar-
guably healthy challenges. 
 13. Compare, e.g., Paul Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Ba-
bies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 531 (1994) (document-
ing and rejecting justifications for tax exceptionalism), Karla W. Simon, Con-
stitutional Implications of the Tax Legislative Process, 10 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 
235, 237–44 (1992) (observing substantial differences between tax and other 
areas of regulatory law yet rejecting tax exceptionalism), and Lawrence Zele-
nak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 
64 N.C. L. REV. 623, 630 (1986) (rejecting “treating interpretation of the [In-
ternal Revenue] Code as a subject distinct from the interpretation of any other 
statute”), with DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE 86–87 (2000) (contend-
ing that the tax legislative process is unusually dominated by interest groups 
and reflects other unique pathologies that justify special interventions), Brad-
ford L. Ferguson, Frederic W. Hickman & Donald C. Lubick, Reexamining the 
Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities 
of the Process, 67 TAXES 804, 823 (1989) (contending that the uniqueness of 
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ments favoring tax exceptionalism.14 We assume for now that 
tax and other regulatory regimes differ in degree rather than in 
kind, but accept as possible that further development of our 
theory may establish the tax regime as meaningfully different 
in kind, such that our theory applies differently for tax than for 
other regimes.  
We also add two important caveats. One is that we make 
no claim as to other factors that might undermine a regime’s 
efficacy and legitimacy, such as selective enforcement, or per-
vasive noncompliance coupled with apparent regulator acquies-
cence through nonenforcement. The other is that we largely 
leave aside issues of enforcement beyond the efforts of regula-
tors to target regulated parties’ minimal compliance through 
regulations, case-by-case enforcement and adjudication, or 
both.  
Toward these ends, in Part I, we offer general observations 
concerning regulatory compliance. We consider how parties 
seek to comply with regulatory statutes, and how aggressive or 
cautious they aim to be in the face of ambiguous statutory 
meaning. We also discuss the extent to which forces other than 
government enforcement efforts might constrain minimalist 
compliance. In this regard, we examine the relationship be-
tween regulated parties’ compliance efforts and the norms of 
their relational community.  
In Part II, we reflect upon how regulatory regimes attempt 
to achieve their purposes. We note particularly the reliance of 
regulatory regimes on terms of art, and the sources of those 
terms. We discuss the role of statutory purpose in defining and 
contextualizing those terms. We also consider the extent to 
which regulatory regimes may be particularly dependent on 
history in their evolution and development, delineating particu-
larly our polar case, tax, as a regime that is strongly and fun-
damentally contingent upon its history and trajectory. 
In Part III, we show how laws reflect the extent of a re-
gime’s fundamental historical contingency. Laws attach conse-
quences to particular categories of behavior. Laws must estab-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
the tax legislative process means that tax legislative history “should be consi-
dered as having virtual parity with the statute itself ”), and Mary L. Heen, 
Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 
771, 814–19 (1997) (suggesting that the Internal Revenue Code is unique in 
its complexity, its constantly changing nature, and its insulation from the 
influence of special interest groups). 
 14. See generally Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax 
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006). 
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lish ways of determining category membership and, implicitly, 
must justify why category members are being treated a particu-
lar way and in the same way. We demonstrate how the ways of 
determining category membership can create categories that 
cannot be fully justified in a principled manner, and how they 
do so in the case of regimes that are strongly historically con-
tingent. 
In Part IV, we present a stylized contrast between a suc-
cessful, less trajectory-dependent regime, where the categories 
complement one another and produce significant coherence, 
and a less successful, more historically contingent regime, 
where the categories are in tension with one another and the 
regime suffers from considerable incoherence. 
I.  THOUGHTS ON REGULATORY COMPLIANCE   
When Congress and administrative agencies draft statutes 
and regulations, they surely anticipate that many regulated 
parties will have incentives not to comply. If enough regulated 
parties simply flout a regulatory regime’s mandates and are not 
effectively called to account, so that compliance appears to be 
optional, then the regime’s efficacy and legitimacy will be com-
promised. But wholesale intentional noncompliance is rare; 
most regulated parties will at least try to satisfy regulatory re-
quirements. That said, compliance is far more complicated than 
a simple binary choice to comply or not. Given regulatory re-
quirements that are frequently ambiguous or unclear, regu-
lated parties may face several more-or-less reasonable alterna-
tives. In such instances, they often will not make the choices 
that regulators prefer and instead will choose to comply more 
minimally.  
A. DEGREES OF COMPLIANCE 
An extensive scholarly literature exists concerning the 
compliance problems of complex regulatory regimes. Much of 
this literature revolves around two compliance models—the 
deterrence or coercive model and the accommodation or cooper-
ative model.15 These two models in turn reflect different con-
                                                                                    
 15. See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance, and the Firm, 76 
TEMP. L. REV. 451, 453–55 (2003) (recognizing “two visions” of regulated par-
ties within the compliance literature); see also Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich 
H. Earnhart, Depiction of the Regulator-Regulated Entity Relationship in the 
Chemical Industry: Deterrence-Based vs. Cooperative Enforcement, 31 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 603, 611–44 (2007) (describing both models and 
studying them empirically). 
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ceptions of noncompliant actors. The deterrence model contem-
plates regulated parties as rational actors motivated by self-
interest determined by weighing the benefits and costs of non-
compliance—an equation that can be altered by expanding gov-
ernment enforcement efforts and increasing penalties for viola-
tions.16 The second model assumes that most regulated parties 
want to comply with the law and will respond more positively 
to persuasion, education, and assistance than to penalties.17 Of 
course, regulated parties are not a homogenous group, and the 
assumptions driving both models accurately capture some seg-
ment of the relevant population; indeed, it seems likely that 
many if not most regulated parties respond to both models, de-
pending upon the circumstances.18 For expository ease, we pre-
sume that regulated parties make cost-benefit determinations 
based on their assessments of costs and benefits broadly con-
strued, including not only monetary savings and the possibility 
of legal sanctions but also extra-legal rewards and sanctions 
relating to reputation, personal feelings of virtue and law-
abidingness, and other factors.19  
Regulated parties sometimes do just flout regulatory re-
quirements. They may have different reasons for disobeying the 
law, whether calculated self-interest, principled disagreement, 
                                                                                    
 16. See, e.g., Malloy, supra note 15, at 453 (describing the firm under the 
deterrence model as “a rational profit-maximizer, obeying the law only when it 
is in the firm’s best economic interest to do so”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., 
“No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Prob-
lem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 389–407 (1981) (analyz-
ing deterrence methods by reference to relative costs and benefits). 
 17. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 8, at 3–4 (contending that people are na-
turally inclined to comply with laws they perceive as legitimate); see also Alli-
son F. Gardner, Beyond Compliance: Regulatory Incentives to Implement Envi-
ronmental Management Systems, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 662, 664–67 (2003) 
(discussing one such cooperative program for accomplishing statutory goals 
and enforcing regulatory requirements); Christine Parker, Compliance Profes-
sionalism and Regulatory Community: The Australian Trade Practices Re-
gime, 26 J.L. & SOC’Y 215, 216 (1999) (observing that “self-regulatory and 
compliance-oriented models of corporate regulation have been adopted in 
areas as varied as occupational health and safety, equal employment opportu-
nity, environmental regulation, consumer dispute resolution, securities regu-
lation, and antitrust”).  
 18. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
158–62 (1992) (contending that regulation should incorporate both deterrence-
oriented and cooperative methods in response to varying regulated party mo-
tives and circumstances); Malloy, supra note 15, at 456 (suggesting that the 
deterrence and cooperative models are not mutually exclusive). 
 19. See Claire A. Hill, The Law and Economics of Identity, 32 QUEEN’S 
L.J. 389, 406–21 (2007) (discussing identity payoffs for particular identities 
such as law-abidingness and civic mindedness). 
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or simple ignorance.20 There is no question, however, that these 
parties lack any remotely colorable legal argument to justify 
their noncompliance. At the other extreme, sometimes regu-
lated parties will attempt to comply maximally with the law, 
rejecting anything but the greatest possible adherence to regu-
latory requirements.21 These maximal compliers may have dif-
ferent reasons for pursuing a high level of compliance, whether 
for the larger public good, the simple desire to avoid confronta-
tion with regulators, or perhaps even because they perceive 
their interests to be aligned with those of the regulators.22 Nei-
ther those who flout the law nor those who comply maximally 
hold much interest for our account. If positions taken by the 
flouters became more mainstream, such that regulated parties 
begin to perceive compliance with regime requirements as op-
                                                                                    
 20. Robert Kagan and John Scholz similarly divide firms that fail to 
comply with regulatory requirements into three subgroups: amoral calculators 
who conclude that the benefits of disobedience outweigh the risk and cost of 
getting caught, political citizens who generally want to comply with the law 
but disobey out of principled disagreement with what they see as arbitrary or 
unreasonable legal requirements, and incompetent organizations that simply 
fail to adequately educate and supervise employees. See Robert A. Kagan & 
John T. Scholz, The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory En-
forcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 5, at 67, 67–68. 
 21. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. 
REV. 215, 221–23 (2002) (broadly criticizing tax planning). We do not contend 
normatively that maximal compliance is desirable. In any event, what counts 
as maximal compliance may be difficult to characterize. One possible defini-
tion could equate maximal compliance with what the regulating agency would 
want, but this formulation unduly elevates the agency’s desires, which may 
not be coextensive with some principled views of what the regime is and 
should be doing. In some instances, a regulated party may truly believe that it 
is acting in accordance with statutory requirements, and that the relevant 
agency’s alternative interpretation of the statute is mistaken, only to have a 
court side with the agency. See id. at 224 (recognizing that, even in a system 
with no planning, litigation between the regulator and regulated parties will 
nevertheless occur). All this being said, for expository ease, we will generally 
treat maximal compliance as being what a regulator, or perhaps an idealized 
regulator, would want. 
 22. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, 
Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond 
Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004) [hereinafter Gunningham et 
al., Social License and Environmental Protection] (examining reasons for over-
compliance with legal requirements); see also Dorothy Thornton, Robert A. 
Kagan & Neil Gunningham, When Social Norms and Pressures Are Not 
Enough: Environmental Performance in the Trucking Industry, 43 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 405, 406 (2009) (noting that “many regulated firms routinely go 
‘beyond compliance,’ taking nonlegally required actions that advance regulato-
ry goals,” for example by building in margins of error in complying with regu-
latory requirements); discussion infra Part I.B (discussing potential align-
ments in the interests of regulators and regulated parties). 
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tional, a regulatory regime’s efficacy and legitimacy might be 
threatened.23 As it is, flouters are largely dismissed as scof-
flaws and cranks, their overall impact on efficacy and legitima-
cy is typically small, and government enforcement efforts 
against them may even be largely expressive.24 Maximal com-
pliance, not surprisingly, does not hurt and may even further 
efficacy and legitimacy, for example by reinforcing a norm of 
compliance.25  
Our principal concern is with regulated parties who fall be-
tween these two extremes, which we will label for convenience 
minimal compliers.26 These parties operate in the gray areas of 
the law, but they do so in vastly different ways. Some are ag-
gressive planners. These parties comply at least facially with 
the law, but often do no more than that.27 They file their tax 
                                                                                    
 23. See KIRCHLER, supra note 11, at 67 (making a similar point).  
 24. See, e.g., id., at 21–27 (documenting studies showing that most tax-
payers do not evade the tax laws outright); Dave Rifkin, A Primer on the “Tax 
Gap” and Methodologies for Reducing It, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 377, 406–
07 (2009) (observing that nonfiling of tax returns represents a mere eight per-
cent of federal tax code noncompliance and characterizing aggressive IRS pur-
suit of tax protesters instead as a “battle over public perception” undertaken 
primarily for its deterrent effect). 
 25. See KIRCHLER, supra note 11, at 70 (concluding that, “if a taxpayer 
believes that tax compliance in her or his country is perceived as a virtue and 
the majority of people comply and condemn evasion, than [sic] she or he is 
more likely to comply”); Hill, supra note 11 (discussing same). 
 26. Other scholars, particularly in the tax context, have distinguished 
regulated parties who take positions the legality of which is unclear from 
those whose actions are clearly illegal. See, e.g., KIRCHLER, supra note 11, at 
21 (recognizing degrees of compliance and observing that “non-compliance 
does not necessarily imply the violation of law”); Michelle Hanlon & Joel Slem-
rod, What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reac-
tions to News About Tax Shelter Involvement, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 126, 126–27 
(2009) (distinguishing “tax aggressiveness” from noncompliance); Rifkin, supra 
note 24, at 378–79 (attributing some portion of “noncompliance” with the fed-
eral income tax laws to taxpayers who utilize legal, though perhaps unin-
tended, loopholes or adopt legal tax positions and strategies); Michael Wenzel, 
The Impact of Outcome Orientation and Justice Concerns on Tax Compliance: 
The Role of Taxpayers’ Identity, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 529, 630 (2002) (dis-
tinguishing clearly illegal acts of tax evasion from “borderline cases” involving 
certain tax minimization strategies). 
 27. Throughout this Article, we talk about facial compliance, or com-
pliance with the letter or fact of the law, that violates the law’s purpose or 
spirit. Although we discuss at some length the existence and role of statutory 
purpose in regulatory regimes, see infra Part II.B, we also recognize that this 
concept is impossible to define rigorously. Nevertheless, the great weight of 
common sense and intuition, as well as the frequent references to the purpose 
or spirit of the law in the scholarly literature, suggest that the concept has 
enough content to be useful and used. Consider in this regard the following 
contracts example: An employment agency has a provision in its agreement 
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returns and permit applications, submit to required inspec-
tions, and otherwise engage the regulatory regimes that govern 
their actions. They also engage reputable lawyers to help them 
calculate their compliance with great care, discerning in ad-
vance the gray areas of statutory and regulatory text and plan-
ning their behavior to conform colorably to the law. In short, 
this group seeks to comply in the most minimal way possible, 
acting only so as to preserve a facially plausible argument that 
they have formally complied with the statute and related regu-
lations, irrespective of the law’s spirit. For example, tax shelter 
participants file their tax returns and pay the taxes shown as 
due, but employ aggressive interpretations of the tax laws to 
report and pay tax liabilities that are dramatically lower than 
would be the case with more maximal compliance. Taxpayers in 
this category may enter into transactions that, but for the tax 
effects, they would never contemplate.28  
Other minimal compliers are more moderate in their plan-
ning. They are more cautious and less inclined to “push the 
envelope” of what the law will allow. Yet, members of this 
group may be just as inclined to choose a close or narrow read-
ing of statutory and regulatory text and legislative history that 
reduces their compliance costs over an equally reasonable (or 
perhaps even better-supported) but more expensive alterna-
tive.29 Some may seek a greater margin of safety by taking po-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
with a firm to the effect that if the firm hires anyone whose name the em-
ployment agency provides, the firm owes the agency a commission. The em-
ployment agency then gives the firm a telephone directory for the city in which 
they are both located. Even if other facts prove less susceptible to arguments 
over the contract’s purpose or spirit, we maintain that it would be hard not to 
characterize that particular action as spirit-violative.  
 28. The economic substance doctrine, a common law anti-abuse standard 
that the courts often apply to invalidate transactions for federal income tax 
purposes, includes as one of its elements “whether the transaction has any 
practical economic effects other than the creation of income tax losses.” ACM 
P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Jacobson v. 
Comm’r, 915 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1990)); Joseph Bankman, The Economic 
Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 9–10 (2000) (recognizing the need for 
nontax economic consequences as an element of the economic substance doc-
trine).  
 29. Consistent with the literature on regulatory compliance generally, in 
speaking of the cost of compliance, we mean amounts expended by a regulated 
party to satisfy regulatory requirements in addition to amounts paid to profes-
sionals to explain legal requirements and develop compliance strategies. See, 
e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small 
Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 7–11 
(2004) (describing different types of regulatory compliance costs as part of 
study); Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, The Limits of the Economic Analysis 
of Regulation: An Empirical Case and a Case for Empiricism, 15 LAW & POL’Y 
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sitions that are quite close to those that have passed muster 
before.30 Unlike aggressive planners, moderate planners will 
not seek out elaborate tax shelters or other eyebrow-raising 
techniques. They will, however, go as far as their comfort level 
with risk allows them in using cost-reduction strategies.31 
Whether more aggressive or more cautious, minimal com-
pliers by definition will follow a regulatory regime less or diffe-
rently than regulators would like.32 As we discuss further be-
low, regulators will consequently react to minimal compliance 
by pursuing enforcement actions, adopting or amending regula-
tions, seeking statutory changes, or some combination thereof. 
Regulated parties will then respond by adjusting their efforts, 
again triggering regulatory reaction. Of course, in some sense, 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
271, 271–73 (1993) (defining compliance costs in these terms for purposes of 
study).  
 30. We have already recognized some maximal compliers may in good 
faith adopt interpretations that they truly believe comply with legal require-
ments but that regulators and courts later judge noncompliant. Cf. Weisbach, 
supra note 21, at 224. By contrast, our description of minimal compliers here 
encompasses those who hew quite closely to existing legal pronouncements. 
Certainly these two groups overlap. One may distinguish them, however, by 
assuming that the former are unaware that they are operating in the gray 
area of the law while the latter are more cognizant of the uncertainty of their 
position. 
 31. The recent case of Nelson v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 70 (2008), aff’d, 568 
F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2009), offers an interesting example from the tax context. 
Farmers who ordinarily reported their income from sugar beet production over 
two tax years consistent with statutory requirements lost their sugar beet crop 
to unusually wet weather, collected insurance proceeds in Year 1, and inter-
preted ambiguous statutory language as allowing them to defer 100% of the 
insurance proceeds to Year 2. See id. at 71–73. Reviewing courts concurred 
with the IRS that the taxpayers should have recognized the insurance 
proceeds in Year 1, but agreed with the taxpayers that the statute was ambi-
guous and that they should not be otherwise penalized for taking an alterna-
tive position in good faith on their tax return. See Nelson, 568 F.3d at 665–66; 
see also Nelson, 130 T.C. at 78–79. Although the Nelson example concerns tax 
law compliance, examples of this phenomenon are legion throughout the regu-
latory sphere. One particularly colorful example involved an importer of coffee 
that had a shipment of beans damaged by water during a hurricane and 
sought to salvage as many beans as possible by drying the beans, skimming off 
those that had molded, and rebagging the remainder for sale abroad if not in 
the United States; more than four years of litigation ensued over Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requirements and the importer’s compliance 
therewith. See United States v. 484 Bags, More or Less, 297 F. Supp. 672, 673 
(E.D. La. 1969), vacated, United States v. 484 Bags, More or Less, 423 F.2d 
839 (5th Cir. 1970); Carl Borchsenius Co. v. Gardner, 282 F. Supp. 396, 400–
05 (E.D. La. 1968).  
 32. In this Article, we define maximal compliance as striving for the 
greatest possible adherence to regulatory requirements. See discussion supra 
note 21. 
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all law proceeds in this way. Common law is particularly ame-
nable to cumulation of this type, as precedents necessarily in-
corporate the trajectory of issues that courts have resolved and 
as conduct adjusts to take into account previous cases, subse-
quently facing its own court challenges. As we will contend, 
while this interaction between regulators and the regulated 
may sometimes yield better, more comprehensive, and more 
nuanced law, at other times it leads to incoherence.  
B. PUSH AND PULL 
Complying minimally certainly involves more risk and may 
involve more effort than complying maximally.33 When will it 
be worthwhile to take extra risk or expend additional effort? 
Some obvious factors include how much of a payoff there is for 
minimal compliance, how many other constraints there are 
that might limit use of techniques potentially available, and 
the relevant norms in the industry.  
Regulated parties that might on some metric benefit from 
complying more minimally and have plausible minimal com-
pliance strategies available to them sometimes choose instead 
to comply more maximally. Social norms and reputational con-
cerns may, by themselves or in combination with other factors, 
outweigh the direct economic costs of compliance.34 Moreover, 
in some regimes, the interests of regulators and regulated par-
ties may overlap more directly. Companies may, for example, 
be motivated to comply maximally with disclosure require-
ments under the federal securities laws to avoid third-party 
lawsuits; plaintiffs’ lawyers are notoriously quick to bring a 
suit where they think they can show faulty disclosure. A com-
pany that is less than forthcoming in its disclosure may also be 
viewed unfavorably in the markets: third parties may infer that 
what a company does not forthrightly reveal must be negative. 
Moreover, the law articulates a standardized form such disclo-
sures must take. Mandatory, standardized disclosures may si-
multaneously advance both regulator and regulated party in-
terests by helping investors investigate and compare securities 
                                                                                    
 33. Of course, not complying at all involves the least effort and may be 
riskiest. Maximal compliance at least necessitates ascertaining what the law 
requires. As noted, however, neither total noncompliance nor maximal com-
pliance is the focus of this Article. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
 34. See, e.g., Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Pro-
tection, supra note 22, at 326–27 (documenting impact of reputational con-
cerns on corporate compliance attitudes). 
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offerings and giving them confidence to participate in the secur-
ities markets.35  
The proliferation of cooperative compliance programs fur-
ther demonstrates the potential for commonality of interests. 
Consider, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) Project XL (so named for “eXcellence” and “Leadership”), 
in which the EPA allows regulated parties to propose and im-
plement innovative methods of improving environmental per-
formance—thereby serving as testing grounds for new ideas—
in exchange for flexibility in satisfying regulatory require-
ments.36 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) likewise has established a collection of cooperative and 
voluntary programs that, for example, exempt employers from 
routine inspections and allow them to claim “star” status in ex-
change for maintaining exemplary safety records and satisfying 
other program certification requirements.37 “Star” status pre-
sumably helps a company’s reputation and may help it compete 
with its peers; if its peers all become stars as well, then it pre-
sumably does not want to risk the reputational cost of not being 
a star.  
Norms that discourage minimal compliance arise not only 
for regulated parties but also for their lawyers. In some fields, 
lawyers may tend to advise more maximal compliance. Consid-
er, for example, the practice by corporate law firms of routinely 
sending memos to their clients reporting not only judicial hold-
ings but also dicta and judicial pronouncements made in 
speeches and articles, and advising their clients to conform 
their behavior even to guidance that has no legal force.38  
                                                                                    
 35. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure 
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 680–707 (1984) (offering 
arguments concerning the rationale for mandatory, standardized disclosures). 
 36. See generally Dennis D. Hirsch, Project XL and the Special Case: The 
EPA’s Untold Success Story, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 222–34 (2001) (de-
scribing Project XL and offering examples of XL projects). 
 37. See Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The 
Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1105–08 (2005) (de-
scribing the Voluntary Protection Program and other OSHA programs). 
 38. Compare Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and 
the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporate Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 
360–64 (2009) (discussing how corporate law firms give their clients cautious 
advice that encourages maximal compliance), with Richard Lavoie, Deputizing 
the Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shel-
ters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 46 (2001) (“[Tax] attorneys often find such savings 
through the exploitation of obscure gaps in the statutory scheme, exploitations 
which are completely at odds with sound tax policy or the intent of the draf-
ters.”), and infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. Of course, this is not to 
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Moreover, in some, and perhaps many, fields, regulated 
parties may anticipate being on different sides of a particular 
issue at different times. For instance, the same party might be 
both a patent holder today and a licensee tomorrow. For that 
matter, particularly in transactional fields, today’s adversary 
may be tomorrow’s partner. Such circumstances may constrain 
minimal compliance for two reasons. A party that anticipates 
being on the other side of an issue may not want to complicate 
its efforts to advance potentially useful arguments.39 Less ob-
viously, the regulated party may belong to a reputational com-
munity that would frown upon particularly legalistic or overly 
technical arguments.40  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
say that all lawyers within a given field have the same level of caution; indeed, 
we would expect that firms might sort by reputation, where one firm of law-
yers in a particular field is known to be more cautious and another is known to 
be more aggressive. Still, we think that it is fair to characterize the general 
ethos in some fields of law as more cautious than that of other fields.  
 39. An interesting issue arises as to the interests of law firms versus per-
haps different interests of their clients. Some law firms have clients on both 
sides of an issue—for instance, hostile acquirers and companies defending 
against hostile acquirers, or bankruptcy debtors and bankruptcy creditors. To 
what extent might a law firm in that position be foreclosed from making ar-
guments or taking positions in their clients’ interests? To what extent might a 
law firm’s behavior be affected by its role, status and history in the reputa-
tional community of its peer law firms? These questions are largely beyond the 
scope of this Article. That being said, James Freund offers a fascinating illu-
stration of a dynamic among lawyers who are repeat players in the transac-
tional world, in the form of a playlet of acquisition negotiations involving the 
characters of Sol Sagacity and Perry Prudent, respectively seller’s and pur-
chaser’s outside counsel, who know one another from representing opposing 
clients in other deals. One interchange is as follows:  
Sagacity: Come on, Perry . . . . You know you’d ask for the same thing 
if you were in my shoes. In fact—I just remembered—you did ask for 
it in that Lorax-Grinch deal where you represented the seller! 
Prudent: That’s right, Sol—and you handed me the same ungracious 
little speech I just gave you. I’ve been lying in wait all these years. 
JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 514 (1975).  
 40. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 
LAW & POL’Y 355, 363–72 (1987) (identifying and analyzing the cultural dy-
namics of regulatory communities); Parker, supra note 17, at 227–33 (consi-
dering the implications of regulatory community dynamics in the context of 
the Australian trade practices regime); see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law 
in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business 
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1807–14 (1996) (recognizing similar pheno-
mena in the context of commercial and other market transactions); Claire A. 
Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of In-
complete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 211–13 (2009) (arguing that con-
tracting parties known to exploit loopholes will find transacting more difficult 
and expensive because of the wariness of potential partners).  
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These constraints are, of course, limited. It is hard to im-
agine a regulatory regime where the regulated parties’ inter-
ests align precisely with those of the regulators. Many, and 
perhaps most, regulated parties will engage in varying degrees 
of minimal compliance in the form of boundary pushing, and 
regulators will police those boundaries and pull regulated par-
ties back toward the regulators’ preferences. In the course of 
that push and pull, regulated parties may have little stake in 
the broader integrity of the underlying regime. Regulators may 
have more interest in maintaining coherence, but they also are 
subject to competing influences, such as political pressure and 
resource-allocation limitations. Press and public reaction to 
particular conduct may gain such salience that the agency 
must act, even if it would rather focus on other priorities. In 
the tax context, for example, both political pressure to maxim-
ize revenue collection41 and judicial canons construing exclu-
sions and deductions narrowly42 may color how regulators in-
terpret the law as envisioned by Congress. For that matter, 
regulators may choose to allow small instances of minimal 
compliance as a sort of pressure-release valve to discourage re-
gulated parties from pushing the envelope in more novel ways 
or declining to comply outright.43  
Some regulatory regimes may present instances where the 
interests of regulators and regulated parties are more or less 
intractably divergent. Tax may be a particularly extreme ex-
ample. Even though Congress and the Treasury Department 
sometimes adopt taxpayer-friendly rules—i.e., rules written 
with administrability or public policy concerns rather than rev-
                                                                                    
 41. See, e.g., Gary L. Rodgers, The Commissioner “Does Not Acquiesce,” 59 
NEB. L. REV. 1001, 1024–25 (1980) (recognizing that budgetary pressures 
mean that the IRS is under pressure to interpret ambiguous statutes to max-
imize tax collections). 
 42. See, e.g., INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (“[T]his 
Court has noted the familiar rule that an income tax deduction is a matter of 
legislative grace and that the burden of clearly showing the right to the 
claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.” (footnote omitted)); Comm’r v. Glen-
shaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955) (counseling “liberal construction” to 
the “broad phraseology” in the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of gross 
income); Steve R. Johnson, The Canon That Tax Penalties Should Be Strictly 
Construed, 3 NEV. L.J. 495, 495–96 (2003) (summarizing judicial canons appli-
cable in the tax context). 
 43. See, e.g., Philip A. Curry, Claire Hill & Francesco Parisi, Creating 
Failures in the Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 943, 944 (2007) (ar-
guing that the government might leave open some known tax loopholes to dis-
courage taxpayers from wasting resources in aggressively seeking more ob-
scure or unknown tax loopholes). 
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enue-raising in mind44—the general ethos of tax administration 
emphasizes revenue collection.45 As Joseph Isenbergh observed, 
“[t]he Treasury, naturally enough, regards the reduction of tax 
obligations as a ubiquitous bad thing. Because there are many 
different ways of engaging in transactions with roughly similar 
ends, some more heavily taxed than others, the world in Trea-
sury’s view is a mosaic of bad things.”46 
Meanwhile, taxpayers nearly always want to pay less tax, 
and the sorts of external constraints discussed above do not 
weigh strongly in favor of maximal tax compliance. Aside from 
the occasional whistleblower, third-party enforcement is non-
existent.47 Some comparatively weak constraints may exist. For 
example, evidence exists suggesting that people or companies 
judged to be aggressive in their attempts to minimize their tax 
liability suffer reputational costs, though such costs do not 
seem to be very large.48 Indeed, some people, such as share-
holders very strongly focused on their companies’ after-tax 
earnings, might even favor this kind of behavior. In any event, 
there is no systematic market-based or other nongovernmental 
mechanism for identifying those who are aggressive in seeking 
to reduce their taxes. Thus, taxpayers might rationally assess 
the expected reputational costs of minimal compliance as low.49 
                                                                                    
 44. The tax community recognizes some Internal Revenue Code provisions 
and Treasury regulations as taxpayer friendly, meaning that Congress or 
Treasury has adopted rules that are not revenue-maximizing for public policy, 
administrability, or other similar reasons. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) 
(describing circumstances in which taxpayers take either a deduction or a cre-
dit, depending upon which yields the lower tax liability); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.263(a)-4 (2008) (providing regulations for capitalization of intangible assets 
that include exceptions for de minimis expenditures). 
 45. See, e.g., Lavoie, supra note 38, at 60 (“When the [Internal Revenue] 
Service interprets a tax rule in a manner that maximizes short-term tax col-
lections . . . without consideration of the economic realities of the transaction, 
it does a disservice to the tax system. . . . [This] encourage[s] aggressive tax 
planning.”). 
 46. Isenbergh, supra note 1, at 866. 
 47. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2006) (authorizing awards to whistleblowers 
who provide specific information leading to tax collections); Dennis J. Ventry, 
Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 362–68 (2008) 
(examining the IRS’s whistleblower program, which was substantially streng-
thened by the 2006 amendments to § 7623 of the Internal Revenue Code). 
 48. See Hanlon & Slemrod, supra note 26, at 127 (“[O]n average, a com-
pany’s stock price declines when there is news about its involvement in tax 
shelters, but the reaction is much smaller than for other accounting mis-
steps.”); see also Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax 
Avoidance and Firm Value, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 537, 545–46 (2009).  
 49. See Hanlon & Slemrod, supra note 26, at 137 (“[F]or certain kinds of 
firms, we expect that the release of involvement in a tax shelter will cause the 
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Finally, political forces may react to foreclose particular tax-
planning techniques once they become widely known;50 still, 
this should not be a significant constraint against the general 
search for and use of such techniques. 
This leads to an interesting and initially counterintuitive 
point. We argued above that one constraint against minimal 
compliance may arise where a party anticipates taking contra-
dictory positions under different circumstances. In tax, parties 
also often have an interest in taking contradictory positions; 
this might, at first blush, push them towards more maximal 
compliance.51 But they often engage in minimal compliance, 
including taking highly legalistic and technical positions that 
might seem inconsistent with positions they took previously in 
other matters. There seems to be little or no reputational sanc-
tion for this behavior in the relevant community, perhaps be-
cause the contradictory positions in question are asserted 
against the government rather than against other parties.52 
Without reputational sanction, other reasons to take more 
measured positions do not outweigh the perceived benefits of 
minimal compliance. The government sometimes reacts to mi-
nimal compliance in kind, employing its own highly technical 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
stock price to increase.”). Notably, Hanlon and Slemrod deal mostly with reac-
tions to “tax shelters,” not generic minimal compliance. Although there is no 
universally accepted definition of a tax shelter, the term carries an especially 
negative connotation. As Hanlon and Slemrod acknowledge, even while disap-
proving of tax shelter activity, shareholders might want their firms to pay as 
little tax as possible without getting caught or getting assessed penalties. Id. 
at 127; see also Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax 
Abuse, 62 TAX L. REV. 539, 559–60 (2009) (arguing that corporate taxpayers 
are less likely than individual taxpayers to suffer reputational harm from tax 
shelter involvement). 
 50. The brouhaha surrounding corporate expatriations for tax purposes 
represents just one example. See, e.g., Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional 
Response to Corporate Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols and Sub-
stance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 
496–507 (2005) (documenting and analyzing media and congressional reac-
tions to decisions by U.S.-based corporations to change their tax residence to 
tax haven countries); David R. Francis, Tax Revenues Vanish as Firms Move 
from US to Bermuda, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 22, 2002, http://www 
.csmonitor.com/2002/0522/p01s01-uspo.html (same).  
 51. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 52. That being said, one can envision a norm within a reputational com-
munity that taking highly technical and legalistic positions even to parties 
outside the community is unacceptable. For instance, it might be seen as a 
signal that a party is willing and inclined to behave badly vis-à-vis members of 
the community. Considering when and why there would be a norm approving 
or disapproving technical arguments to a third party is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
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arguments and pursuing positions in one case that arguably 
contradict those asserted previously.53  
If most or all regulated parties under a particular regulato-
ry regime typically try to push the envelope in the same direc-
tion, as might be the case in some areas, it may be easier for 
regulators to push back relatively effectively, and thereby limit 
the regime’s historical contingency. Rather than attacking mi-
nimal compliance case-by-case, regulators may be able to 
promulgate regulations or otherwise craft a coordinated regula-
tory response to common ways that parties exploit statutory 
and regulatory ambiguities; different fact patterns should lead 
to better articulation and refinement of legal requirements. If 
the regulated parties are pushing in many different directions, 
but they are effectively constrained either by their reputational 
community or by limits upon how far the language can be 
twisted, the push and pull may be productive, or at least not 
problematic to the regime as a whole. The case where parties 
are pushing in many different directions and constraints are 
absent—which seems often to be the case in tax, for example—
may lead to the condition we have described, where the only 
way to understand a regime’s requirements and scope is by ref-
erence to its history.  
As yet another contributing factor, tax lawyers are often 
considered, perhaps unfairly, as particularly keen to push the 
envelope in interpreting the tax laws. Jeff Gordon has de-
scribed this ethos as follows:  
Tax planners provide value by structuring a company’s transactions 
so as to minimize tax, applying a formalist’s approach to the con-
straints of the tax law against a background interpretive norm of 
“reasonable basis.” If a close, ingenious reading of the Code and the 
regulations permits a reshaping of economic reality to minimize tax-
es, then excelsior. Whatever the ultimate social desirability of such 
gamesmanship, at least it serves the narrow shareholder interest of 
maximizing after-tax income, that is, increasing the cash in the cor-
porate till.54 
                                                                                    
 53. See, e.g., 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 8:12 (2d ed. 1979) (“[The IRS’s] basic attitude is that because consistency is 
impossible, an effort to be consistent is unnecessary; therefore it need not con-
sider precedents, and it may depart from precedents without explaining 
why.”); Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common 
Law Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2010) (manuscript at 9–12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1471641 (documenting the IRS’s pattern of taking 
inconsistent positions).  
 54. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Con-
trol of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. 
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Gordon blames the massive Enron scandal in part on the 
spreading of this supposed tax lawyer ethos to accountants and 
other professionals.55 Perhaps recent malpractice claims 
against tax lawyers and accountants who promoted particular 
shelters by clients who got caught using the shelters will per-
suade some tax professionals to become more conservative in 
advising their clients; perhaps not.56 
One final constraint that operates more effectively in some 
fields than in others, and particularly badly in tax, is the extent 
to which a law utilizes terms and concepts anchored in the “real 
world” outside of the technical realm of the regulatory regime 
at issue.57 Consider in this regard the rules under section 13(d) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which require that a 
person disclose ownership of more than five percent of certain 
companies.58 Owners often would prefer not to disclose their 
ownership stake. One obvious gambit is to spread the legal title 
among a group of people, all of whom are effectively in cahoots. 
The statute contemplates this possibility by establishing the 
concept of a group; if several people comprise a group as de-
fined in the statute and regulations, they are treated as one 
“person” for reporting requirements, and reporting is re-
quired.59 To avoid reporting, the principal owner will claim she 
and the others are not a group. The push and pull with the 
regulators yields increasing specificity about what constitutes a 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
REV. 1233, 1238 (2002); see also Claire A. Hill, Tax Lawyers Are People Too, 26 
VA. TAX REV. 1065, 1067–68 (2007) (describing a continuum of tax lawyer be-
havior, where one end is the “(Almost?) Over the Edge Envelope Pushing” tax 
lawyer who has a perhaps extreme form of the tax lawyer ethos Jeffrey Gor-
don describes).  
 55. Gordon, supra note 54, at 1238. 
 56. See Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and Their Implica-
tions for Tax Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 295–96, 306–07 (2008). 
 57. See discussion infra Part II.B (considering statutory and regulatory 
use of ordinary and technical terms). 
 58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2006); SEC Rule 13d-1, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13d-1 (2009).  
 59. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (providing, in connection with information 
reporting that, “[w]hen two or more persons act as a partnership, limited 
partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or 
disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a 
‘person’ for the purposes of this subsection”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (ela-
borating: “When two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of equity securities of an issuer, the 
group formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership, 
for purposes of sections 13(d) and (g) of the Act, as of the date of such agree-
ment, of all equity securities of that issuer beneficially owned by any such 
persons.”). 
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group, but the outcome does not stray too far from what intui-
tion suggests. After all, the group concept, while technical, is 
importantly anchored to something in the real world.  
Still, we must be careful not to make too much of this 
point. Even assuming that the concept of what is anchored in 
the real world can be made precise, we can readily find exam-
ples of terms ostensibly anchored in the real world that seem to 
have escaped their moorings. Like the securities laws, the tax 
laws also have provisions using the concept of group, and for 
similar reasons. Numerous tax provisions may be easily cir-
cumvented by related parties acting at the behest of one anoth-
er. For example, a corporation with property that has declined 
in value might want to recognize a loss for tax purposes but 
cannot do so until it sells the property, which it still wants to 
use. The corporation might be inclined to “sell” the property to 
its owner or to a subsidiary, thus triggering the loss,60 absent 
attribution rules precluding loss recognition in related-party 
sales.61 To prevent such evasion, the tax code expressly re-
quires affiliated groups of corporations, defined annually by 
reference to stock ownership, to file a single tax return aggre-
gating their income and deductions.62 However anchored in the 
real world the basic concept of an affiliated group may be, that 
anchoring has not prevented the tax concept from straying far 
from its moorings. The parameters of the affiliated group defi-
nition have been the subject of much litigation as taxpayers 
have manipulated stock terms and ownership structures to ei-
ther achieve or avoid affiliated group status;63 the courts have 
resorted to an extra-statutory business purpose requirement64 
                                                                                    
 60. See 26 U.S.C. § 165(a) (2006) (allowing a deduction for losses realized). 
 61. See id. § 267(a)(1), (b)(2)–(3) (disallowing deductibility of losses from 
related-party sales and defining relevant related-party relationships).  
 62. See id. § 1502 (requiring consolidated returns for affiliated groups); id. 
§ 1504 (defining affiliated group by reference to stock ownership); see also S. 
REP. NO. 617, at 9 (1918) (“[A] law which contains no requirement for consoli-
dation puts an almost irresistible premium on a segregation or a separate in-
corporation of activities which would normally be carried as branches of one 
concern. Increasing evidence has come to light demonstrating that the possi-
bilities of evading taxation in these and allied ways are becoming familiar to 
the taxpayers of the country.”).  
 63. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9714002 (Dec. 6, 1996) (“There are situ-
ations in which taxpayers try to achieve affiliation status, and there are situa-
tions in which taxpayers try to avoid affiliation status.”).  
 64. See LAWRENCE M. AXELROD & MARK A. KOZIK, CONSOLIDATED TAX 
RETURNS § 4:10 (4th ed. Supp. 2008) (discussing judicial reliance on the busi-
ness purpose doctrine to counter manipulation of the affiliated group defini-
tion). 
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and Congress has provided Treasury and the IRS with broad 
discretion simply to disregard ownership changes they find ab-
usive.65 Even if these reactions have limited “abuses,” they 
have not helped the tax laws avoid being strongly contingent on 
their trajectory; the parameters of the affiliated group defini-
tion, as with many other important concepts in tax, are hard to 
explain and justify coherently.  
II.  THOUGHTS ON REGULATORY REGIMES   
As we have observed, regulatory laws tend to differ from 
other types of law in the complexity of both their subject matter 
and the programs they establish.66 We have also noted that 
regulatory laws vary from other types of laws in their suscepti-
bility to planning by minimal compliers.67 These differences are 
related, as technical complexity yields greater ambiguity, which 
in turn creates more planning opportunities for those inclined 
to operate in the gray areas of the law. 
Perhaps as a result of their complexity, regulatory statutes 
often contain certain elements that other types of laws do not. 
For example, regulatory statutes tend to articulate the policy 
goals or administrative tasks that Congress seeks to accom-
plish, either explicitly through special sections dedicated to 
that function or implicitly by express behavioral requirements 
using aspirational or purposive language. Also, regulatory sta-
tutes typically do not merely identify certain behaviors as off-
limits. Rather, regulatory statutes usually at least outline the 
basic programmatic approaches that Congress believes will ac-
complish the identified goal or task, and these provisions typi-
cally require regulated parties affirmatively to undertake cer-
tain acts. Finally, because Congress recognizes that textual 
gaps and ambiguities are inevitable or even intentional,68 it 
                                                                                    
 65. See 26 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(5)(F); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9714002 (Dec. 6, 
1996) (“The principal theme of section 1504(a)(5)(F) is anti-abuse. Generally, 
any guidance should operate as a one-way street to be used by the Service to 
deal with manipulative practices intended to either establish or break affilia-
tion.”). 
 66. See discussion supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 67. See supra Part I.A. 
 68. Several factors contribute to the inevitability of statutory ambiguity, 
especially in the regulatory context. When dealing with technical subjects and 
complicated programmatic schemes, even the most adept legislators cannot 
anticipate every circumstance that may fall at the margins of statutory terms 
and commands. Also, even if members of Congress are largely united in their 
assessment that a particular problem warrants a legislative solution, they 
may be sharply divided regarding the programmatic details for accomplishing 
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often grants executive branch or independent agency officials 
the authority to fill in programmatic details and otherwise in-
terpret statutory requirements, perhaps with the assistance of 
the courts. Putting all of these elements together into a single 
statutory scheme is arguably a recipe for greater statutory am-
biguity than is present for other types of laws.  
In this Part, we describe more fully a few aspects of regula-
tory statutes that we regard as relevant to our theory. First, we 
examine more closely the ways in which regulatory statutes 
routinely, though not always, articulate their goals and utilize 
purposive language. We recognize tax law as an important ex-
ception from this pattern. We then examine how regulatory 
statutes and regulations employ both ordinary and technical 
terms in pursuit of statutory goals. Relatedly, we consider how 
differences in usage can give rise to interpretive challenges 
that may lead to the trajectory problem that we have identified.  
A. STATUTORY PURPOSE 
When legislators enact laws, they always do so to accom-
plish particular goals. In the context of regulatory statutes, 
however, legislators are often quite explicit in stating the goals 
they seek to accomplish. The typical regulatory statute is pre-
mised upon at least one easily identifiable core purpose: a prob-
lem to be solved, a goal to be achieved, or a task to be accom-
plished. The Clean Air Act aims to protect and improve air 
quality and, correspondingly, prevent and control air pollu-
tion.69 The Occupational Safety and Health Act aspires to as-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
that goal; hence, legislators may deliberately leave statutory language ambi-
guous in their effort to get legislation passed in the first instance, anticipating 
that agencies or courts will resolve whatever issues may arise as a conse-
quence. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 20 (noting with respect to the 
“hard cases” of statutory interpretation, “[i]f an issue is unanticipated by the 
majority coalition, its agents are unlikely to say anything about the issue, for 
obvious reasons. If the issue is controversial, the agents are likely to suppress 
discussion in order to preserve cohesion within the coalition. In fact, the two 
phenomena are often interrelated: an issue becomes conveniently unantici-
pated because it would be controversial to talk about it openly”); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540 (1983) (“Almost 
all statutes are compromises, and the cornerstone of many a compromise is the 
decision, usually unexpressed, to leave certain issues unresolved.”); Sunstein, 
supra note 3, at 1741 (recognizing that lawmakers may reach agreement at 
one level of abstraction even while disagreeing at another level).  
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (2006); Sierra Club v. Larson, 2 F.3d 462, 464 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (stating that Congress enacted the Clean Air Act “to control and 
mitigate air pollution in the United States”). 
  
1176 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:1151 
 
sure “safe and healthful working conditions.”70 The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 seeks, among other goals, to ensure “fair” 
and “honest” securities markets and a “more effective” banking 
system.71 The Federal Power Act endeavors to further “the pub-
lic interest,” promote efficiency, and conserve natural resources 
by regulating the transmission and sale of electricity.72  
Many regulatory statutes concentrate the articulation of 
their purposes in a single statutory provision.73 The Clean Air 
Act and Occupational Safety and Health Act both begin with 
provisions containing congressional findings and elaborate ex-
pressions of statutory purpose emphasizing, respectively, con-
trolling air pollution74 and “assur[ing] . . . safe and healthful 
working conditions.”75 Others, like the Federal Power Act, 
sprinkle purposive language here and there through different 
statutory provisions, with phrases like “assuring an abundant 
supply of electric energy throughout the United States”76 and 
“obtain[ing] economical utilization of facilities and resources in 
any area.”77  
At least one particularly significant regulatory regime 
represents something of an outlier in this regard: the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC). The IRC contains hundreds of provisions 
that are largely definitional, dedicated to identifying which 
                                                                                    
 70. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006). 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006). 
 72. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824–824a (2006). 
 73. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b; Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401. 
 74. The Clean Air Act (CAA) clearly identifies “air pollution” as its target, 
not least by repeating that phrase multiple times in its opening findings and 
declaration of purpose. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)–(b); see also id. § 7470 (articu-
lating separately the purposes of part of the CAA dedicated to prevention of 
significant deterioration of air quality, which purposes in turn emphasize “air 
pollution,” “air quality,” and “clean air resources”). The CAA’s declaration of 
purpose specifies also three programmatic elements for controlling air pollu-
tion: “a national research and development program,” “technical and financial 
assistance to State and local governments,” and “the development and opera-
tion of regional air pollution prevention and control programs.” Id. 
§ 7401(b)(2)–(4). 
 75. OSHA’s declaration of purpose specifies as its objective “to as-
sure . . . safe and healthful working conditions” for “every working man and 
woman” and “to preserve our human resources,” both in general and in identi-
fying thirteen separate avenues for achieving that objective. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 651(b). 
 76. 16 U.S.C. § 824a (providing for the regulation of electricity generation, 
transmission, and sale via regional districts). 
 77. Id. § 824a-1 (authorizing exemptions from state laws, rules, and regu-
lations based on certain findings). 
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transactions contribute either positively or negatively to net 
income for the purpose of computing one’s annual tax liabili-
ty.78 The IRC contains no statement of policy or declaration of 
purpose, however, and in fact is remarkably devoid of purposive 
language. One might try to infer that revenue-raising must be 
the purpose behind the IRC. Yet many if not most provisions 
serve other social or economic functions that are in tension 
with the goal of raising revenue; for example, the IRC grants 
individual taxpayers deductions for home mortgage interest79 
and charitable contributions,80 and permits businesses to de-
duct the cost of health insurance for their employees81 while 
not requiring employees to recognize the benefit as income.82 
Congress has allowed deductions for various business expenses 
but denied or limited those deductions where it either disap-
proves of some aspect of the expenditure or prefers not to forego 
so much revenue.83 Hence, Reuven Avi-Yonah has ascribed 
three different purposes or goals to the IRC: raising revenue, 
facilitating redistribution, and regulating private activity.84 
None of these purposes are stated; all are merely implied.  
In other words, each individual provision or sub-provision 
of the IRC may possess its own particular theoretical or politi-
cal justification, but the federal income tax laws collectively 
lack coherence and always have.85 At a deep level, the IRC 
                                                                                    
 78. For example, 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2006) defines income broadly. After that, 
Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part II of the Internal Revenue Code 
contains twenty separate provisions addressing items specifically included in 
gross income, and Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part III of the Internal 
Revenue Code contains forty-one separate provisions addressing items specifi-
cally excluded from gross income for federal income tax purposes. Subtitle A, 
Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part VI of the Internal Revenue Code then offers 
another forty separate provisions providing itemized deductions for individual 
and corporate taxpayers. These are only a small number of the many, many 
tax provisions that contribute to determining taxable income.  
 79. See 26 U.S.C. § 163. 
 80. See id. § 170. 
 81. See id. § 162; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (2006).  
 82. See 26 U.S.C. § 106. 
 83. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(2) (allowing a deduction for travel ex-
penses, but only if they are not “lavish or extravagant under the circum-
stances”); id. § 162(m) (disallowing a deduction for wages in excess of one mil-
lion dollars paid to certain corporate executives). 
 84. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 
1, 3 (2006). 
 85. For example, former General Counsel to the Treasury and tax expert 
Randolph Paul observed in 1938 that “[i]n 25 years of development federal 
taxation has had little direction on the legal side. There has been no chart or 
compass. Growth has been ex necessitate. . . . There is pressing need today for 
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lacks a principled account of who should or should not be pay-
ing taxes, and why or why not. Many will submit that everyone 
ought to pay their fair share, but few agree on precisely what 
share is fair. Moreover, many will maintain, with little prin-
cipled analysis, that their own burdens are unfair. Inertia more 
than consensus drives what little agreement exists as to the 
goals of the IRC. The extent to which other regulatory regimes 
may reflect similar problems remains to be seen.86 
Of course, we recognize that the concept of statutory pur-
pose is a difficult one, impossible to define rigorously or precise-
ly. Critiques of judicial reliance on statutory purpose in inter-
preting statutes are legion, not least because the abstract na-
ture of purposive language makes it hard to apply consistently 
or objectively to resolve more detailed and concrete program-
matic ambiguities.87 Also, some will say that all law reflects 
compromises to appease interest groups, rendering the notion 
of broad statutory purpose relatively meaningless.88 Neverthe-
less, at a minimum, purpose serves as an important rhetorical 
device: law simply must be articulable as furthering some sort 
of public purpose rather than merely appeasing particular in-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
more careful thinking in terms of our federal tax system as a unit.” Jasper L. 
Cummings, Jr. & Alan J.J. Swirski, Interview: Randolph Paul, A.B.A. SEC. OF 
TAX’N NEWS Q., Winter 2009, at 4, 5 (quoting RANDOLPH E. PAUL, SELECTED 
STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, SECOND SERIES v–vi (1938)).  
 86. Various commenters with whom we have discussed this project have 
suggested campaign finance, certain aspects of patent law, and antitrust as 
potential candidates for comparison on this score. As noted, we hope to consid-
er some or all of these regulatory regimes in future work. 
 87. Depending upon one’s perspective, this may be a feature rather than a 
bug. 
 88. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 26–27; Frank H. Easterbrook, 
The Supreme Court, 1983 Term–Foreword: The Court and the Economic Sys-
tem, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 46 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in 
the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 427 (1989); see also LEO KATZ, 
ILL GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF 
THE LAW 13–14 (1996). Not everyone accepts the indeterminacy of statutory 
purposes. Consider the following argument: 
Whether words be the skin of the idea, in the simile of Mr. Justice 
Holmes, or chameleons which take their color from their surround-
ings, in the figure occasionally used by Continental jurists, the skin, 
we must remember, is already half filled; the chameleon’s natural 
gray shines through the red or green which it has assumed from its 
surroundings. Although we are convinced that hanging a murderer 
has no deterrent effect whatever, or has even a slight stimulating ef-
fect, we can scarcely recast the obvious immediate purpose of a sta-
tute which makes murder capital. 
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 878–79 (1930). 
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terest groups.89 Correspondingly, whatever the limitations of 
purposivist analysis in statutory interpretation, there is little 
doubt that government attorneys, regulated parties, and re-
viewing courts routinely rely on purpose in structuring argu-
ments concerning the proper meaning of statutes and regula-
tions.90  
B. ORDINARY AND TECHNICAL TERMS 
All law uses terms from ordinary language and more tech-
nical terms. Regulatory regimes are no different. When a re-
gime uses a term from ordinary language, that term’s ordinary 
meaning may serve as an important determinant of a term’s 
meaning in law. Yet the law may attempt for its own purposes 
to craft a meaning that differs, perhaps significantly, from or-
dinary understanding. The law also frequently uses technical 
terms, some that it borrows from other fields like business or 
science, and others that it creates from whole cloth. Ordinary 
and technical terms are by no means mutually exclusive; an 
otherwise ordinary term may become a technical term when 
either a statutory definition or common law interpretation over 
time deviates from ordinary usage. Also, a term may be largely 
technical, yet its meaning may be informed by some ordinary 
usage, and vice versa.91  
Consider, for example, the word “employee,” which is fre-
quently used in the regulatory context. Nonlawyers would have 
little difficulty defining employee. Dictionaries all offer common 
                                                                                    
 89. See Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, “Purposivism,” and the In-
terpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677, 708–09 (1996) (discussing 
purpose as “a useful fiction”); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from 
Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 79–85 (2006) (recognizing the impor-
tance of statutory purpose in establishing context for textual analysis). 
 90. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 
1541–43 (2007) (disregarding a literal reading of statutory text in light of leg-
islative history and statutory purpose); Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv. 546 U.S. 
481, 486 (2006) (“Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the 
whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute . . . .”). 
 91. There is voluminous writing on the law’s use of ordinary versus tech-
nical terms. See, e.g., BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 
178–93 (1993) (discussing the role of language in the law); Mary Jane Morri-
son, Excursions Into the Nature of Legal Language, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 
287–90 (1989) (discussing particularly the distinction between technical and 
ordinary understandings of terms used by lawyers); Frederick Schauer, A Crit-
ical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1123–24 (2008) 
(recognizing that ordinary terms may hold special meanings in the legal con-
text). 
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definitions.92 People know an employee when they see one, or at 
least think they do. “Employee” also enjoys a long history of 
definition at common law, for example in assessing an alleged 
employer’s contract or tort liability for the actions of its pur-
ported employee.93 Irrespective of either ordinary usage or 
common law, many regulatory statutes that impose require-
ments either on employees or on their employers define the 
term for their own purposes to delineate a different group of 
persons. Thus, for example, federal government employees and 
postal workers are not employees under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act94 or the Occupational Safety and Health Act95 but 
they are explicitly so under the tax laws.96 Carve-outs like 
these may be entirely defensible on policy grounds, and they 
may not cause interpretive issues, but they do represent a first 
step in creating disconnects between ordinary perceptions and 
legal definitions, a point to which we shall return. Beyond tar-
geted carve-outs or inclusions, and more problematic for pur-
poses of interpreting regulatory requirements, many of the sta-
tutory definitions of “employee” are decidedly circular. For ex-
ample, different statutes have defined employee as “any em-
ployee,”97 or “any individual employed by an employer,”98 or “an 
officer, employee, or elected official.”99 In the absence of further 
guidance, the courts often turn to the common law to assess 
who is an employee.100 Yet, regulators administering different 
                                                                                    
 92. See, e.g., MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 408 (11th ed. 
2003). 
 93. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, 
PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS 42–48 (7th ed. 2009) (presenting cases 
discussing whether a person was an employee or an independent contractor 
for purposes of determining liability of a third party who would be the “em-
ployer”). 
 94. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(A)–(B) (2006).  
 95. Id. § 652(5)–(6). 
 96. 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c) (2006). The tax code further defines “employee” 
differently for purposes of other types of withholding, explicitly including life 
insurance salesmen and home workers for Federal Insurance Contributions 
Act (FICA) withholding purposes, see id. § 3121(d)(3)(B)–(C), but specifically 
excluding them for Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) withholding pur-
poses, see id. § 3306(i).  
 97. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (defining “employee” for the purposes of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA)). 
 98. Id. § 1002(6) (defining “employee” for the purposes of ERISA). 
 99. 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c) (defining “employee” for the purposes of federal 
income tax withholding). 
 100. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) 
(finding ERISA’s definition of employee to be “completely circular” and there-
fore turning to the common law to define the term); Cmty. for Creative Non-
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regimes have adopted separate rules and regulations under 
each for assessing who is an employee as opposed to a manager 
or an independent contractor with variable results,101 and judi-
cial applications of even the common law standard may vary 
from regime to regime.102 Thus, as one prominent study ob-
served: 
The NLRA, the Civil Rights Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act—each major labor and 
employment statute—has its own definition of employee and its own 
way of drawing the line between employees and independent contrac-
tors. Many of these definitions appear to be quite similar. But they 
were created over a period of a half century, and their language is of-
ten vague or circular, leaving them open to a broad range of interpre-
tations. As a result, the line has been drawn differently in the differ-
ent statutes, depending on the inclinations of the agency at the time 
or Supreme Court doing the drawing. These differences in interpreta-
tion mean that a worker might be deemed an employee for purposes 
of the FLSA but an independent contractor for purposes of the NLRA, 
without any apparent policy justification for the disparity of treat-
ment. The Commission finds no principled justification for this regu-
latory morass.103 
“Mine” and “miner” are other ordinary terms, commonly 
associated with land, mineral extraction, and those who work 
in that context. Yet, the Black Lung Benefits Act only covers 
those who work in coal mines,104 while the Federal Mines Safe-
ty and Health Act (FMSHA) definition includes other types of 
mines but also equipment, tools, and surrounding surface 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (referencing common law principles 
in the absence of a statutory definition to interpret “employee” for purposes of 
the Copyright Act of 1976). But see NLRB. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 
U.S. 85, 93–94 (1995) (suggesting that giving “considerable deference” to an 
administering agency’s definition of “employee” might be more appropriate 
than relying upon common law). 
 101. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298–301 (purporting to 
apply common law standards for identifying employees for FICA and FUTA 
withholding tax purposes but listing twenty particular factors for considera-
tion in making that assessment). 
 102. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 326 (recognizing that the FLSA’s definition of 
“employee” may be broader than the common law definition); FedEx Home 
Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (applying a ten-factor 
common law agency test to evaluate whether a worker is an employee for the 
purposes of the NLRA); Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (employing a five-factor test to determine whether a worker quali-
fies as an employee for the purposes of the FLSA). 
 103. U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, THE 
DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS–
FINAL REPORT 64 (1994). 
 104. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(d) (2006). 
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structures and environs.105 Again, these different definitions 
may be based on meaningful policy justifications; silver miners 
presumably do not suffer from Black Lung Disease, while at 
least some tools, equipment, and surface structures associated 
with mining activities are obviously relevant to assuring work-
er safety. Nevertheless, over time these definitions have gener-
ated some unusual disputes over coverage, with arguably con-
fusing results. Circuit courts have reached different conclusions 
regarding whether machine repairmen for mining companies 
who work in shops distant from any actual mining site are coal 
miners eligible for benefits.106 Whether or not a lay person 
would think a truck or a road is a mine, both trucks used in 
mining and roads leading to a mine would seem arguably to fall 
within the FMSHA’s broad definition, but the Secretary of La-
bor has interpreted the statutory definition to include private 
roads leading to mines but not the trucks that drive on them.107 
While the ordinary meanings of employee, mine, miner, 
and other like terms no doubt influence regulated parties, 
agencies, and courts as they seek to interpret those terms, it is 
hardly surprising that the same word, even one with an ordi-
nary meaning, may mean different things depending upon the 
context. Yet, the fact that some statutes define these terms dif-
ferently, in ways that diverge significantly from ordinary mean-
ing, represents an important cognitive disconnect between legal 
and lay understandings,108 one that may presage difficulties of 
the type we discuss. Regulated parties are most likely to perce-
ive the law as legitimate when acts or conditions that seem to 
be similar in all salient respects yield the same legal conse-
quences, and will be more skeptical of laws whose seemingly 
ordinary terms encompass an odd assemblage of dissimilar 
items that do not so obviously warrant the same treatment.  
                                                                                    
 105. See id. § 802(g)–(h). 
 106. Compare Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor 
v. Consolidation Coal Co., 884 F.2d 926, 935 (6th Cir. 1989) (repairmen eligi-
ble for benefits), with Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor v. Ziegler Coal Co., 853 F.2d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 1988) (repairmen not 
eligible for benefits). 
 107. See Sec’y of Labor v. Nat’l Cement Co. of Cal., 573 F.3d 788, 794–96 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (recognizing the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of 30 
U.S.C. § 802(h)(1)(B) to cover roads but not vehicles as reasonable). 
 108. See, e.g., E. Inv. Corp. v. United States, 49 F.3d 651, 653–55 (10th Cir. 
1995) (assessing the applicability of the different tax definitions of “employee” 
to a group of sales representatives); see also United States. v. MacKenzie, 777 
F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[I]n drawing the line between who is an em-
ployee and who is an independent contractor there will be some doubtful cas-
es . . . .”). 
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Other statutory terms derive from the specialized vernacu-
lar of a particular industry that is being regulated, or perhaps 
the legal profession itself. If a statute targets a particular in-
dustry, it stands to reason that terms that industry partici-
pants commonly employ will find their way into statutory pro-
visions, and that industry understandings will inform their 
meanings. Consider, for example, the term “security,” which 
the Securities Act of 1933 defines by a list of examples includ-
ing but by no means limited to notes, stocks, bonds, debentures, 
and many others.109 Bankers and securities lawyers will readily 
interpret security according to the understandings of their in-
dustry. Alternative lay meanings referring to safety and protec-
tion from harm are not likely to be confused with the statutory 
definition. Rather, the question is whether statutory usage de-
viates from industry conceptions—an inquiry that in many cas-
es should have a determinate answer.  
Finally, regulatory law is littered with terms that are ar-
tificial creatures of the statutes they inhabit, useful as short-
hand to capture more complicated concepts, but largely de-
tached from any real world conception. It is difficult to imagine 
anyone using statutorily defined terms like “technological sys-
tem of continuous emission reduction,”110 or “semi-critical re-
processed single-use device”111 outside their statutory contexts. 
As Joseph Isenbergh once famously observed about a particular 
                                                                                    
 109. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (“The term ‘security’ means any note, 
stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted-
ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, 
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of depo-
sit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral 
rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of 
deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based 
on the value thereof ), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered 
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in gen-
eral, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’, or any certif-
icate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt 
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing.”).  
 110. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(7) (2006) (defining “technological system of conti-
nuous emission reduction” for the purpose of establishing standards of perfor-
mance for new stationary sources of air pollutants under the Clean Air Act). 
 111. 21 U.S.C. § 321(ll)–(mm)(2) (2006) (building on definitions of other 
terms to define “semi-critical reprocessed single-use device” as a “device that is 
intended for one use, or on a single patient during a single procedure . . . that 
has previously been used on a patient and has been subjected to additional 
processing and manufacturing for the purpose of an additional single use on a 
patient” and “that is intended to contact intact mucous membranes and not 
penetrate normally sterile areas of the body”).  
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tax term of art, “there is no natural law of reverse triangular 
mergers.”112 Interpreting such terms is not complicated by or-
dinary understandings regarding their meaning. Nevertheless, 
as we discuss further below, their utter lack of ordinary mean-
ing and consequent detachment from any other nonstatutory, 
real-world anchor may leave them quite susceptible to distor-
tion and incoherence. 
At some level, all laws are merely collections of words with 
potentially variable meanings. In some instances, however, the 
meanings of statutory terms—whether ordinary, specialized, or 
artificial—are a matter of very broad if not complete consensus; 
deviations from that consensus are limited and readily compre-
hensible given statutory goals and context. Legal outcomes con-
cerning particular applications of such terms may be readily 
associated with statutory purpose and text; a regime’s history 
may offer further explanation and support for particular con-
clusions without being an integral part of an explanation of 
what the regime does and how. By contrast, some regimes con-
tain many terms the meanings of which are established and 
maintained either by fiat or through some elaborate trajectory 
of interpretation and application that deviates substantially 
from whatever consensus understanding statutory terms may 
have once enjoyed. For such regimes, it is difficult, if not im-
possible, to understand some of its important legal outcomes 
except by reference to history, broadly construed. At either end 
of this continuum of meaning, the push and pull between regu-
latory parties and regulators that we described in Part I.B re-
flects disagreements over the meanings of words used by regu-
latory statutes and regulations. The considerations we dis-
                                                                                    
 112. Isenbergh, supra note 1, at 879. Isenbergh notes in particular, in dis-
cussing the well-known tax case of Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935):  
At the outset, Gregory raises the question whether the notion of a “re-
organization” in the 1928 Act is simply a creature of the statute or 
whether it imports something from life—life in this case being the 
world of business in which “reorganizations” occur. Within the terms 
of the statute, the taxpayer had a winning case because she had done 
everything the statute required. If, however, we view the statute not 
as an exhaustive definition of reorganizations but as incorporating 
something from the world of business, the government had a strong 
case. Certainly, what happened in Gregory did not much look like the 
sort of adjustment of a business that the notion of a “reorganization” 
would bring to mind if derived from the business world and not solely 
from the statute. 
Id. at 867–68. Isenbergh additionally observes that the statute “purported to 
define reorganizations,” as contrasted “with the Revenue Act of 1921, which 
purported only to enumerate certain transactions included within the term 
‘reorganization.’” Id. at 868. 
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cussed in that Part are important determinants of where any 
particular regulatory regime will lie on such a continuum. 
III.  THOUGHTS ON CATEGORIES IN LANGUAGE AND 
LAW   
Regimes that can only be explained by reference to their 
history and trajectory will lack coherence and consistency. Such 
regimes frequently allow parties to comply in ways that violate 
the spirit of at least some of what the regime is trying to 
achieve. Moreover, they sometimes treat differently things that 
are hard to distinguish in any principled way. Regimes that 
rely less on their history to convey their requirements and 
scope do this far less often. In Part I, we discussed the forces 
that might make a regime’s trajectory more or less strongly his-
torically contingent. In this Part, seeking further insight into 
what historically contingent regimes look like, we explore a dif-
ferent conception of the language of regulatory regimes.  
Law operates by specifying what people (or entities) must, 
may, or may not do. The specification is made using a category. 
Psychologists Markman and Ross define categories as “groups 
of distinct abstract or concrete items that the cognitive system 
treats as equivalent for some purpose.”113 In legal categories, 
“law” substitutes for cognitive systems. Legal categories assign 
consequences for category membership; they also specify crite-
ria for membership. A statute that prohibits X must specify 
how we can tell whether something is an X. A law providing 
that securities fraud is punishable by X years in prison and $Y 
fine must tell us how to determine what actions fall into the 
category of securities fraud. A law requiring federal govern-
ment approval for the marketing and sale of drug delivery de-
vices must tell us how to assess the terms “drug” and “de-
vice.”114 A law that imposes a tax on taxable income must tell 
                                                                                    
 113. Arthur B. Markman & Brian H. Ross, Category Use and Category 
Learning, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 592, 592–93 (2003). The psychology and philos-
ophy literatures develop theories about categories at considerable length; 
while the theories differ among themselves and articulate and develop many 
nuances, most of those differences and nuances are not relevant to our ac-
count. See generally LAWRENCE W. BARSALOU, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: AN 
OVERVIEW FOR COGNITIVE SCIENTISTS 15–51 (1992); CONCEPTS (Eric Margolis 
& Stephen Laurence eds., 1999), DOUGLAS L. MEDIN, BRIAN H. ROSS & AR-
THUR B. MARKMAN, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 317–50 (2005); see also GREGORY 
L. MURPHY, THE BIG BOOK OF CONCEPTS (2002).  
 114. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)–(h), 
393(b)–(d)(2) (empowering the FDA to ensure that drugs and devices are “safe 
and effective” and defining “drug” and “device”); see also, e.g., FDA v. Brown & 
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us how to determine what combination of financial inputs and 
outflows constitutes taxable income.115  
The “classical view” was that categories were rule-based 
and, more specifically, that categories had necessary and suffi-
cient conditions.116 It is fair to say, though, that most models of 
categorization have rejected a strong classical view for most 
types of categories.117 A more generally used model involves 
prototypes. The category has one or more typical (or perhaps 
ideal) prototypes at its core. Candidates for inclusion in the 
category are assessed by how much they resemble the proto-
types, where resemblance is determined by reference to salient 
similarities.118 Some psychologists have also discussed another 
type of category, a goal-derived category, one “defined solely in 
terms of how [its] members fulfill some desired goal or plan.”119  
Most laws and regulations define category membership ei-
ther by explicit lists of features or through prototypes that con-
vey the necessary elements for membership. Laws also utilize 
categories organized around goals. In this Part, we construct a 
taxonomy of legal categories consisting of three types: those 
with necessary and sufficient conditions, those with prototypes, 
and goal-derived categories.  
Categories with necessary and sufficient conditions are, in 
principle, rule-like, with the same frailties well acknowledged 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (reviewing FDA determina-
tions that nicotine is a drug and cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are drug 
delivery devices under the FDCA).  
 115. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1(a)–(d), 11(a) (2006) (imposing tax on “taxable in-
come” of individuals and corporations); id. § 63(a) (defining “taxable income” 
by reference to other defined terms and provisions within Title 26, Chapter 1, 
Subchapter A of the U.S. Code). As observed, much of the Internal Revenue 
Code is dedicated to defining taxable income. See supra note 78 and accompa-
nying text. 
 116. BARSALOU, supra note 113, at 29 (“According to the classical view of 
categories in philosophy and linguistics, rules underlie categorization. Al-
though rules can take a variety of forms, the ideal rule specifies properties 
that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for category member-
ship.”). 
 117. See id. at 30. 
 118. See, e.g., id. at 28; MURPHY, supra note 113, at 28; Arthur B. Mark-
man & Dedre Gentner, Thinking, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 223, 235–41 (2001). 
The philosophy literature also has a great deal to say about this issue. See, 
e.g., Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of “Meaning,” in READINGS IN LANGUAGE 
AND MIND 157 (Heimir Geirsson & Michael Losonsky eds., 1996).  
 119. MURPHY, supra note 113, at 62; see also Lawrence W. Barsalou, Deriv-
ing Categories To Achieve Goals, in 27 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND 
MOTIVATION: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY 1, 1 (Gordon H. Bower ed., 
1991) (originating the term “goal-derived categories”).  
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in the literature comparing rules and standards.120 These cate-
gories may provide a roadmap for what many would regard as 
spirit-violative conduct—conduct that honors the literal terms 
of a law but violates what the law is trying to achieve. Our ac-
count of laws that are specified using necessary and sufficient 
conditions is not new, except insofar as we assert that some 
regulatory regimes may present more opportunities for spirit-
violative conduct than others, a point to which we will return in 
Part IV.  
Prototype-centered categories are far more critical to our 
account. The prototype is supposed to generate the category; 
the category members should be relevantly similar to the proto-
type. Critically, in regulatory regimes that cannot be well-
explained except by reference to their history and trajectory, 
the process by which the prototype generates the category does 
not assure any kind of principled relevant similarity, and effi-
cacy and legitimacy suffer. This is especially the case where the 
regulatory category is centered around a term with an ordinary 
meaning.  
Goal-centered categories begin as standards. They may be-
come more rule-like as they are interpreted and applied,121 but 
they will typically remain mostly standard-like. These catego-
ries are supposed to provide ex post flexibility and discretion, 
helping law limit the spirit-violative behavior that more rule-
like categories often permit. In our account of regimes with 
more historically contingent trajectories, the goal-centered cat-
egories fail to fulfill this task. 
A. CATEGORIES SPECIFIED BY NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT 
CONDITIONS 
In both common parlance and law, many categories might 
seem to be specified by necessary and sufficient conditions. A 
category would have particular conditions for membership; a 
candidate for membership would be a member if and only if it 
                                                                                    
 120. See generally Kaplow, supra note 10; see also Lawrence A. Cunning-
ham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in 
Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 
1417–35 (2007). We note too, that many categories seemingly specified by ne-
cessary and sufficient conditions are in fact subject to override to treat non-
members as members, and to treat members as nonmembers.  
 121. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 577–79 (observing that standards be-
come more rule-like over time); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with 
Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 964–65 (1995) (recognizing that rules and stan-
dards are not entirely distinguishable). 
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met the conditions. But very few categories have such condi-
tions. Quick introspection suggests why this is so, but writing 
on the point is voluminous.122 Imagine trying to define neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for everyday words such as “wa-
ter” or “diamond” or “car.”123 Consider likewise in this regard 
what counts as a “deadly weapon” for purposes of attaching le-
gal consequences. One quickly runs up against cases that are 
hard, not because a complicated inquiry is needed to yield a 
definitive resolution of the issue, but because none is forthcom-
ing.  
In law, the best examples of categories with necessary and 
sufficient conditions seem to be laws that confer a status or 
treatment on parties who follow a particular roadmap: creating 
a legal easement, establishing a limited liability company, ef-
fectuating a merger, or engaging in a transaction that the tax 
laws will treat as a like-kind exchange. Even these may not be 
completely binary cases.124 In fact, categories purely defined by 
necessary and sufficient conditions are rare. One important 
reason is that, while necessary and sufficient condition catego-
ries achieve predictability, they are also susceptible to manipu-
lation. When the law provides a roadmap to achieve a particu-
lar legal consequence, people may be able to follow the roadmap 
to achieve results that are rather different from what the law 
intended and that perhaps violate the law’s spirit while honor-
ing the letter. Tax provides many examples, such as provisions 
that allow taxpayers to defer recognizing gain from corporate 
reorganization transactions, which the tax laws define by 
                                                                                    
 122. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, 
AND MIND (2001); see also BARSALOU, supra note 113, at 29–30; Putnam, supra 
note 118.  
 123. We shall shortly turn to a discussion of the famous “vehicle” example. 
See infra notes 146–49 and accompanying text. 
 124. Sometimes the law will specify conditions that are necessary but may 
not be sufficient. For example, if young children accomplished all of the steps 
necessary to establish a limited liability company, the law still may not recog-
nize the company’s creation under the general rules governing capacity to con-
tract. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS 74 (5th ed. 2006). In other instances, a judge or other decision-
maker may interpret a category expansively so that the conditions that specify 
the category are not even necessary: X does not meet the conditions of mem-
bership in the category but is nevertheless treated as though it were a member 
because X is saliently similar to what is in the category. See infra note 126 and 
accompanying text (discussing the example of de facto merger doctrine). In 
rigorous parlance, there will rarely if ever be a pure case of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, or for that matter a pure case of conditions that are ei-
ther necessary or sufficient. When we use the terms, we mean necessary 
and/or sufficient, or nearly so. 
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roadmap but which the IRS and the courts also require to satis-
fy certain doctrines aimed at preserving the spirit of the law, 
like having a business purpose.125 The doctrine of de facto mer-
ger, adopted by some states, represents another such case.126 
The closer legal categories are to having necessary and suf-
ficient conditions, the more the classic concern about legal for-
malism arises—that someone can do what the law formally re-
quires to obtain a particular desired result where a more con-
                                                                                    
 125. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 368 (2006) (defining “reorganization”); see also 
BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF COR-
PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 12.03 (6th ed. 1999) (“It remains true, there-
fore, that literal compliance with the reorganization provisions is not enough; 
a transaction will be governed by the statutory provisions only if it comes 
within the presuppositions, as well as the language, of the provisions. The 
courts have driven this truth home with a variety of formulations, usually 
classified as the business-purpose, step-transaction, and continuity-of-interest 
doctrines.”). 
 126. To explain more fully: two business entities can combine into one in 
many different ways. In particular, the law recognizes and defines a merger as 
typically requiring a shareholder vote and may also provide for shareholders 
to receive the court-determined value of their shares in lieu of what the mer-
ger terms themselves indicate. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251–258 
(2001 & Supp. 2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 11.01(a), 11.02(a), 11.04(b) 
(2005); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 
AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 215–18 (10th ed. 2007) (dis-
cussing the appraisal remedy historically and in various jurisdictions). Parties 
often do structure their combinations as mergers and follow the associated 
statutory requirements, but sometimes parties combine their businesses in 
other ways, deliberately aiming to fall outside the statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 271, 275 (2001 & Supp. 2008) (recognizing and imposing proce-
dural requirements upon asset sales and corporate dissolutions as transac-
tions distinct from mergers); JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW 
AND POLICY 433–36 (6th ed. 2006) (acknowledging different business combina-
tion structures). In some jurisdictions, only companies that combine expressly 
using the merger statute are subject to its provisions; in those jurisdictions, 
statutes impose necessary and sufficient conditions for inclusion in the merger 
category. See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elecs. Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963). 
In other jurisdictions, however, courts have applied the merger statute to, for 
instance, require a shareholder vote or allow shareholders to have their shares 
valued by a court even though the combination was achieved in some way oth-
er than by following the merger statute. See, e.g., Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 
136 N.W.2d 410, 418 (Iowa 1965); Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25, 30–
31 (Pa. 1958). In other words, those courts recognize transactions that do not 
follow the steps required to effectuate a merger under the applicable merger 
statute as de facto mergers that trigger rights available when a statutory 
merger occurs. It is noteworthy that Delaware and many other states reject 
the doctrine of de facto merger, valuing predictability over arguments about 
equity. See generally WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 713–
15 (6th ed. 2006) (describing origins of the de facto merger doctrine); Wendy B. 
Davis, De Facto Merger, Federal Common Law, and Erie: Constitutional Issues 
in Successor Liability, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 529, 539–40 (describing the 
de facto merger doctrine). 
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textual or intent-based approach might deny that very result. 
The need for some predictability in the law may make this in-
evitable to some extent. Importantly for our purposes, different 
regimes may offer more, or more important, opportunities for 
regulated parties to behave in spirit-violative ways. If there is 
sufficient opportunity to behave in spirit-violative ways, the 
regime’s efficacy and legitimacy may be undermined. But, as 
noted above, legal categories are often, and probably typically, 
not specified by necessary and sufficient conditions. Many more 
are specified by reference to prototypes, a subject to which we 
now turn.  
B. PROTOTYPE-CENTERED CATEGORIES 
In lieu of necessary and sufficient conditions, categories 
are often defined through one or more full or partial proto-
types.127 A prototype captures what a category most obviously 
includes: it is an easy case, sometimes a typical case, and some-
times an ideal case.128 For example, the category of bachelor 
readily admits somebody who is unmarried but available to be 
married in some meaningful sense. George Clooney is a proto-
typical “bachelor.”129    
Alternatively, prototype-centered categories may be speci-
fied through some number of features in a list. Diagnostic cate-
gories in medicine and psychiatry provide a familiar example. 
                                                                                    
 127. See BARSALOU, supra note 113, at 25–31. See generally Arthur B. 
Markman & C. Hunt Stilwell, Role-Governed Categories, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
& THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 329, 330 (2001). A related term, 
“exemplar,” is sometimes used in the literature. While prototype and exemplar 
are not completely synonymous, for purposes of this Article they can safely be 
treated as such; accordingly, we refer only to prototypes and mean by our use 
of this term to include exemplars as well.  
 128. In a sense, a category that is defined by necessary and sufficient con-
ditions represents a special case of a category defined by prototype. In other 
words, a prototype could encompass all the conditions that are necessary and 
sufficient for membership in the category. Most, however, do not. Importantly, 
the psychology literature distinguishes prototype-centered categories from 
those defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. See BARSALOU, supra 
note 113, at 28–29. We find it worthwhile to distinguish the two category types 
in this Article to help summon the intuition that there will always be penum-
bral cases and to provide an intuitive sense of how we might resolve such cas-
es. 
 129. See, e.g., Elisabeth Eaves, #3 Los Angeles, FORBES.COM, Mar. 1, 2007, 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/3/forbeslife-cx_singles07_Los-Angeles_2503.html 
(stating that George Clooney is the “most eligible bachelor” in Los Angeles); 
Top 100: America’s Most Wanted, PEOPLE, July 10, 2000, at 60, 62 (naming 
George Clooney the most eligible bachelor in 2000); see also WINTER, supra 
note 122, at 85–92. 
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A doctor may diagnose someone as having a particular disease 
if she presents at least four of eight common symptoms. It may 
prove typical for a subset of patients to exhibit four particular 
symptoms off the list of eight; that cluster of four symptoms 
also represents a prototype.130  
Indeed, intuition tells us that in ordinary language, most 
words, terms, and concepts are actually prototype-centered cat-
egories. For most words, terms, and concepts, we quickly recog-
nize some clear examples. We can also readily imagine cases 
that are murkier. The Pope and a thirteen-year-old boy, while 
meeting the formal definition of bachelor, are certainly not pro-
totypical.131 The obvious instances represent the category’s 
core, while the more questionable ones are at the category’s pe-
numbra.  
Given the reliance of ordinary language on prototypes, it is 
not surprising that legal categories often center on prototypes 
as well.132 Murder—that is, a killing warranting punishment—
provides an example. At common law and within many crimi-
nal statutes, the category of murder includes intent-to-kill 
murder, depraved-heart murder, and felony murder,133 but not 
killing in the heat of passion134 or justifiable homicide.135 Each 
                                                                                    
 130. See BARSALOU, supra note 113, at 34. 
 131. “Bachelor” as a category centered around a prototype is a standard 
example in the literature, as is the observation that the Pope is not a prototyp-
ical bachelor. See, e.g., WINTER, supra note 122, at 85–89. Winter’s discussion 
develops far more nuance than is relevant for our account on use of the term 
prototype. See also BARSALOU, supra note 113, at 30.  
 132. See, e.g., WINTER, supra note 122, at 139–65. See generally FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 266–77 (2003) (dis-
cussing generalities and their effect on lawyers and law). 
 133. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.1 (2d ed. 
2003) (listing types of murder recognized at common law and existing in vari-
ous statutes); see also id. §§ 14.2, 14.4–.5 (discussing each of these types in 
depth).  
 134. See id. § 15.2(a) (describing “a killing while in a reasonable ‘heat of 
passion’” as “the most common sort of voluntary manslaughter. . . rather than 
murder or no crime”); see also, e.g., Cooper v. State, 977 So. 2d 1220, 1223 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (categorizing a killing in the heat of passion as man-
slaughter rather than murder under Mississippi law); Rhodes v. Common-
wealth, 583 S.E.2d 773, 775 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing a homicide in the 
heat of passion as voluntary manslaughter rather than murder under Virginia 
law (quoting Wilkins v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 580, 583 (1940))).  
 135. See LAFAVE, supra note 133, § 1.6(a) (describing justifiable homicide 
as “no crime at all” notwithstanding intent to kill); see also, e.g., MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 97-3-15 (2006) (declaring the killing of another person justifiable, and 
thus legally authorized, under specified circumstances); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 2305 (2009) (declaring a killing of another person under specified circum-
stances “guiltless”).  
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of these categories (or, one might say, subcategories) is its own 
prototype of murder. 
Regulatory law relies heavily on prototype categories. The 
law’s reach clearly encompasses what is in the core; as law 
evolves, penumbral cases are considered and resolved. An ob-
vious prototype of the category of income for tax purposes is 
wages received from an employer.136 By statute, alimony pay-
ments are also income for tax purposes,137 but that was not al-
ways the case;138 meanwhile, child support payments and prop-
erty settlements incident to divorce are still not taxable, even 
though it is often difficult to distinguish them from alimony 
payments as a practical matter.139 Similarly, bald eagles are 
prototypical endangered species and readily come to mind when 
contemplating the purposes of the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA).140 More obscure creatures like the Illinois cave amphi-
pod and the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly are obviously species 
as well under the ESA’s broad definition.141 Despite inclusive 
                                                                                    
 136. This is consistent with one of the most central provisions of the exist-
ing federal income tax laws, which defines “gross income” for such purposes as 
“income from whatever source derived” but also by a list of specific items, the 
first of which is “compensation for services.” 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2006). Indeed, 
wages have been included among items expressly listed as income since some 
of the earliest income tax statutes. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 
114, 167 (1913). 
 137. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(8). 
 138. See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 152 (1917) (concluding that alimony 
was not part of “the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources” 
subject to income tax under the Tariff Act of 1913). 
 139. See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Federal 
Income Tax Law Applicable to Transfers in Divorce, 55 TAX LAW. 363, 364 
(2002) (arguing that practical line-drawing between alimony, child support, 
and property settlements is impossible). 
 140. See Shannon Petersen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic Mega-
fauna: A Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 
467 (1999) (describing the Endangered Species Act as designed to be “a largely 
symbolic effort to protect charismatic megafauna representative of our nation-
al heritage”). In fact, although bald eagles were officially listed as endangered 
species in 1978, the Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940 preceded the Endan-
gered Species Act and influenced its provisions. See Bald Eagle Protection Act 
of 1940, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250 (1940); Determination of Certain Bald Eagle 
Populations as Endangered or Threatened, 43 Fed. Reg. 6230 (Feb. 14, 1978). 
Bald eagles have since been delisted by the Department of the Interior, though 
they remain protected by the provisions of the Bald Eagle Protection Act. See 
Removing the Bald Eagle in the Lower 48 States from the List of Endangered 
and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346 (July 9, 2007); Lawrence P. Mel-
linger, Symbolic Recovery: The Bald Eagle Soars Again, NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T, Spring 2008, at 54. 
 141. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(8), (14), (16) (2006) (defining “species” to include 
“any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plant” and defining “fish or wildlife” and 
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statutory definitions, however, regulators and the courts strug-
gle to discern exactly when particular groups of animals are 
separate species under the ESA.142 Finally, virtually everyone 
would recognize the male supervisor repeatedly groping and 
directing sexually explicit comments toward a female subordi-
nate as a prototypical example of a hostile work environment 
under Title VII,143 but the parameters of that category are con-
tinually evolving.144  
In most cases, a new candidate may be considered a mem-
ber of the category at issue notwithstanding that it does not 
possess all the features of the prototype(s) or does possess some 
features not in the prototype(s).145 Much of what happens in 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
“plant” in broadly inclusive terms); see also Final Rule to List the Illinois Cave 
Amphipod as Endangered, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,900 (Sept. 3, 1998); Determination 
of Endangered Status for the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 58 Fed. Reg. 
49,881 (Sept. 23, 1993). 
 142. Specifically, the ESA’s definition of species includes “distinct popula-
tion segments” of species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (16). The ESA does not define what 
constitutes a distinct population segment, and there has been substantial liti-
gation over whether this or that particular group of animals represents a dis-
tinct population segment and thus a separate species eligible for listing and 
protection under the ESA. See, e.g., Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1145−50 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewing an agency 
determination that three populations of western gray squirrels, all living in 
Washington State, are distinct for ESA purposes); Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders 
v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 842−52 (9th Cir. 2003) (evaluating an agency finding 
that pygmy-owls in Arizona are distinct from pygmy-owls in northwestern 
Mexico). 
 143. See, e.g., Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(“Of course, behavior like fondling, come-ons, and lewd remarks is often the 
stuff of hostile environment claims, including several previously upheld by 
this Court.”); Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(recognizing allegations of “intentional touching and . . . sexually suggestive 
and vulgar remarks are typical of the offensive workplace behavior giving rise 
to an action to remedy a hostile work environment”); Martha Chamallas, Title 
VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 
307, 356–57 (2004) (recognizing claims of sexual harassment by female plain-
tiffs as prototypes of hostile work environment as well as constructive dis-
charge claims); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., A Unifying Theory of Sex Discrimina-
tion, 34 GA. L. REV. 1591, 1610 (2000) (“The typical hostile work environment 
is a workplace tinged with sexual advances, explicit sex talk, sexual innuendo, 
gender-based hostility, or some combination of such conduct that is severe 
enough to affect an employee’s ability to do her job.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Elisabeth A. Keller & Judith B. Tracy, Hidden in Plain 
Sight: Achieving More Just Results in Hostile Work Environment Sexual Ha-
rassment Cases by Re-Examining Supreme Court Precedent, 15 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 247, 256−71 (2008) (arguing that the courts are inconsis-
tent in applying the standards for hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment and offering examples). 
 145. See BARSALOU, supra note 113, at 28−29. 
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courts and other adjudicative bodies, and in law school, is nec-
essarily a discussion of penumbral cases and an attempt to fig-
ure out whether they fit into the relevant legal category. We 
determine which cases are in the penumbra by considering 
whether they are similar to the prototype(s) in salient respects.  
Consider for example the oft-discussed hypothetical statute 
prohibiting vehicles in the park.146 At first blush, we might 
think the category of vehicle has necessary and sufficient condi-
tions, but it is quickly clear that the category is far from me-
chanical in its application. Instead, vehicle is more properly 
viewed as being centered around a prototype, perhaps a car. 
Certainly, a car is an obvious type of vehicle. But what about 
skateboards? What about bicycles? What about lawn mowers? 
What about cats carrying fleas?147 Skateboards, bicycles, lawn 
mowers, and cats are surely not in the prohibition’s core, but 
they might be in the penumbra.148 We can at least begin to ex-
plore the penumbra and decide what is prohibited by consider-
ing the features of our prototypical vehicle, the car: large, 
heavy, has wheels, has a motor, transports people or things, 
moves fast, potentially lethal. We will often also turn to the 
purpose of the prohibition—reducing the number of pede-
strian/vehicle accidents, perhaps—in order to narrow the set of 
features that are relevant.149 We might then conclude at least 
that lawnmowers and cats should not fall within the prohibi-
tion. Meanwhile, a life-sized cardboard depiction of a car is also 
probably not in the penumbra, given that we are constructing 
the penumbra with a view towards the prohibition’s intended 
purpose. The cardboard car might be more similar to the moto-
rized car than either was to the lawnmower, but the similari-
ties would not be the relevant ones. 
                                                                                    
 146. This is the famous example first discussed in H.L.A. Hart, Positivism 
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606−15 (1958). 
It has been cited and discussed many times since.  
 147. Is there an argument by which a cat might be a vehicle, if it were 
transporting (presumably unintentionally) fleas? This is an argument made by 
one of our students, in a context too convoluted to recount. The answer is 
probably yes, but, as the one of us who responded to our student said, for pur-
poses of legal analysis and ordinary language, we can mostly assume such 
possibilities away—although perhaps not always. 
 148. See Schauer, supra note 91, at 1111 (summarizing Hart’s example in 
these terms).  
 149. Of course, this glosses over the major issue of whose intent counts, 
and what counts as appropriate evidence of intent. See supra notes 87–90 and 
accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of identifying and applying sta-
tutory purpose). 
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When law uses a term from ordinary language, the scope of 
the legal category will not infrequently bear a close relationship 
to common sense understandings of the term.150 If a person 
were to be asked to give the legal definition of vehicle for pur-
poses of a prohibition against vehicles in the park, a likely way 
to proceed would be to start by referencing the prototype, then 
provide some other fairly common examples, and only then 
point out unexpected and perhaps incorrect results regarding 
skateboards or cats. That being said, recall our earlier discus-
sion of the concept of “group” in securities and tax law; an ordi-
nary language meaning of group does little to constrain the le-
gal meaning of “affiliated group” in the tax context.151  
When law uses a more technical term, ordinary language 
may not serve to appreciably limit the category’s scope. Consid-
er the category of “security” for purposes of the federal securi-
ties law, a term that could be characterized as technical, al-
though importantly reflecting a significant nonlaw meaning.152 
The Securities Act of 1933 offers a detailed definition,153 but 
case law also provides that something not contained within the 
definition but serving particular functions can also be a securi-
ty for purposes of the statutory scheme.154 The category of secu-
rity may not, and in fact does not, command complete consen-
sus as to what it covers, but its coverage forms a sufficiently 
coherent whole.  
Our concern is that, in the absence of meaningful con-
straints against minimal compliance pressures, a category’s 
coverage may become incoherent and inconsistent, and the cat-
egory may operate to treat in the same way things that do not 
seem to bear any substance-based relationship to one another. 
Imagine if, in ordinary language, the term bachelor came to 
encompass only George Clooney and men who were of the same 
height and hair color. The category would be inexplicable, out-
side of whatever history led to that definition. Tax again offers 
numerous instances of this phenomenon in law, for example by 
defining a deduction for charitable contributions to include a 
donation to Harvard Law School but not one to the little neigh-
                                                                                    
 150. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra notes 59−65 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing security as an 
ordinary versus technical term). 
 153. See supra note 109.  
 154. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297−98 (1946) (con-
cluding that securities may include items of “a more variable character” if they 
meet the purpose of the Act). 
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borhood boy with cancer and no health insurance,155 or by say-
ing that an unemployed person who lost his house to foreclo-
sure has income from debt forgiveness while a millionaire 
whose sole support is interest from municipal bond investments 
does not have income.156 If enough of a regime’s important con-
cepts become distorted in this fashion, the result may be an 
unprincipled and incoherent regime.  
C. GOAL-DERIVED CATEGORIES 
Categories defined by necessary and sufficient conditions 
or by prototypes are the most common types discussed in the 
category literature.157 As we have noted, some cognitive psy-
                                                                                    
 155. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (2006) (allowing taxpayers a deduction for con-
tributions made only to charities that fall within certain categories, including 
educational organizations but excluding individuals); Rev. Rul. 57-211, 1957-1 
C.B. 97 (denying deduction for donation to hospital to cover the cost of care for 
a particular individual). 
 156. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (defining gross income for federal in-
come tax purposes as including income from discharge of indebtedness), with 
id. § 103 (excluding interest earned from investments in state and local gov-
ernment bonds from gross income for federal income tax purposes). Section 
108 does exclude income from the discharge of indebtedness from gross income 
under limited circumstances which include insolvent or bankrupt taxpayers; 
some taxpayers who lose their homes to foreclosure may fall within these ex-
clusions. See id. § 108(a)(1)–(2). For at least some other taxpayers who lose 
their homes to foreclosure but are not insolvent or bankrupt, Congress 
adopted temporary relief for discharges of indebtedness occurring between 
December 31, 2008, and January 1, 2013. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 108(a)(1)(E) (West 
Supp. 2009).  
 157. See generally WINTER, supra note 122, at 169. There are also other 
types of categories, including Wittgenstein’s conceptualization of categories 
like “game.” See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
§§ 65–71 (1953). As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes: 
[i]t is here that Wittgenstein’s rejection of general explanations, and 
definitions based on sufficient and necessary conditions, is best pro-
nounced. Instead of these symptoms of the philosopher’s ‘craving for 
generality,’ he points to ‘family resemblance’ as the more suitable 
analogy for the means of connecting particular uses of the same word. 
There is no reason to look, as we have done traditionally—and dog-
matically—for one, essential core in which the meaning of a word is 
located and which is, therefore, common to all uses of that word. We 
should, instead, travel with the word’s uses through ‘a complicated 
network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing’. . . . Family re-
semblance also serves to exhibit the lack of boundaries and the dis-
tance from exactness that characterize different uses of the same con-
cept. 
Anat Biletski & Anat Matar, Ludwig Wittgenstein, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 3.4 (2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/ 
#Lan (internal citation omitted). Categories founded on family resemblance 
may have their place in law, but they do not warrant separate analysis. Our 
contrast is, in a sense, between categories that are formed organically, reflect-
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chology scholarship has identified a third type of category that 
is important for our purposes: the goal-derived category, which 
is “defined solely in terms of how [its] members fulfill some de-
sired goal or plan.”158 The legal literature has also discussed 
goal-derived categories, but the discussions are quite limited 
and relate to matters quite different than those we discuss 
here.159  
In ordinary language terms, a goal-derived category might 
consist, for example, of things that will assist weight loss: a 
book with advice on dieting, a jump rope, a pound of celery, a 
collection of diverting music, and stylish clothes that will only 
fit after losing weight.160 In law, where categories specified 
with necessary and sufficient conditions and prototype-centered 
categories will often be importantly rule-like, with compara-
tively detailed specification ex ante and comparatively little 
discretion for the judge or agency ex post, goal-derived catego-
ries will often be standard-like, with very little ex ante specifi-
cation and considerable discretion.161 Goal-derived categories in 
law tend to be broad prohibitions on conduct that violates some 
abstract goal of the law; antifraud and anti-abuse laws often 
fall into this category.  
Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 pro-
vides an example. Specifically, Rule 10b-5 makes it “unlawful 
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange . . . [t]o employ 
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”162 The goal was arti-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
ing some sort of internal relationship between the members versus categories 
that are formed by history and, to caricature, edict, pronounced to have par-
ticular members by authority of the pronouncer. The former is, again to cari-
cature, a discovery; the latter is a creation.  
 158. MURPHY, supra note 113, at 62; see also Lawrence W. Barsalou, Ad 
Hoc Categories, 11 MEMORY & COGNITION 211 (1983). 
 159. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of 
Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 785–86 
(2001); William E. Gallegher & Ronald C. Goodstein, Inference Versus Specula-
tion in Trademark Infringement Litigation: Abandoning the Fiction of the Vul-
can Mind Meld, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1229, 1256 (2004). 
 160. See BARSALOU, supra note 113, at 174; see also Barsalou, supra note 
158. 
 161. Some goal-derived categories develop into categories that are ex ante 
specified to a significant degree. As a court rules on cases involving particular 
fact patterns, and sets forth certain principles, the category can become pro-
gressively more rule-like, as more of the typical cases are those the common 
law has already addressed. 
 162. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).  
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culated first. As the law has developed, it has become more 
rule-like, specifying ex ante actions that constitute fraud. But 
the law remains available to address actions that employ any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud in whatever form they 
might take.  
Another significant example is the step transaction doc-
trine in tax. This doctrine calls for two or more related transac-
tions to be integrated and recast as a single transaction for 
purposes of evaluating their tax consequences.163 For example, 
parties might purport to have engaged in transactions A, B, 
and C, all of which qualify for tax-free treatment. The govern-
ment might contend, however, that the business rationale for 
the three transactions demonstrates clearly that they are, in 
fact, merely part of a single, taxable event; the only reason to 
split the event into three separate steps is to avoid the taxes 
owed from the single-event structure. Under such circum-
stances, the government and the courts often decline to respect 
the taxpayer’s characterization of its separate steps and in-
stead treat the taxpayer as if it executed only the single, inte-
grated transaction.164 
Why might a regime have or need goal-derived categories? 
The categories law uses are generally specified concretely at 
fairly low levels of abstraction. Law is, after all, trying to guide 
action. Prohibiting murder is far more meaningful than prohi-
biting crime or even violent crime, for example.165 As we have 
established, the concrete specification takes the form of proto-
type-centered categories or categories with necessary and suffi-
cient conditions. Both types of categories open the door to spi-
rit-violative behavior. Law therefore needs a way to reach what 
these lower level categories miss, to realize fully the categories’ 
purposes. Goal-derived categories are law’s solution: they 
represent a recourse to the higher-level abstraction that could 
not by itself be the law but that, as a complement to more con-
crete prohibitions, fills in the gaps.  
                                                                                    
 163. See, e.g., BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 125, ¶ 12.61[3] (describing 
the step transaction doctrine as “the judicial requirement that all integrated 
steps in a single transaction must be amalgamated in determining the true 
nature of a transaction”). 
 164. See, e.g., Stephen S. Bowen, The End Result Test, 72 TAXES 722, 
722−23 (1994) (recognizing and describing three different conceptualizations 
of the step transaction doctrine—the end result test, the mutual interdepen-
dence test, and the binding commitment test).  
 165. One common example given for this intuition is the following: People 
are more readily able to imagine a prototypical chair than a prototypical piece 
of furniture. See generally WINTER, supra note 122, at 24−25. 
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IV.  ASSEMBLING THE THEORY   
Regulatory regimes seek to effectuate their goals through 
laws and regulations. Most regulated parties seek to comply. 
Some regulated parties seek to comply maximally, but others 
do so only minimally, or at least differently than regulators 
would like. Regulators react to minimal compliance in various 
ways, including through case-by-case enforcement and litiga-
tion, and by issuing regulations and rulings. We have argued 
that the push and pull between regulated parties and regula-
tors on account of minimal compliance efforts importantly af-
fects how well a regulatory regime works. 
We have described this push-pull trajectory and traced how 
the trajectory progresses through an analysis of how law uses 
language. In this regard, we argue that law may usefully be 
depicted as consisting of three types of categories: categories 
with necessary and sufficient conditions, categories centered on 
prototypes, and goal-derived categories. These categories can 
work well together, to help regulated parties plan their conduct 
while giving regulators needed flexibility to take into account 
new types of situations and to limit the opportunity for spirit-
violative behavior.166 Or the categories can be both internally 
incoherent and in tension with one another. 
Terms or categories with necessary and sufficient condi-
tions may give considerable predictability. Sometimes, regu-
lated parties who seek to comply with the regime only minimal-
ly may use these to obtain a result that may seem somewhat 
spirit-violative. However, for a regulatory regime with a trajec-
tory that clearly relates to and is easily reconciled with statuto-
ry text and purpose, this does not occur often or as to core mat-
ters. Categories with prototypes may also provide predictability 
in many cases. The prototype-centered categories will have 
gray areas that are likewise susceptible to the push and pull 
from minimal compliance and regulator response. The law will 
have to confront new factual situations: What falls within the 
category, though admittedly in the penumbra, and what falls 
outside that penumbra? The resolutions will of course refer to 
precedent in addition to other inputs like ordinary meaning 
and purpose; obviously, there is significant cumulation, as each 
interpretation or decision provides potential authority and jus-
tification. But for less historically contingent regimes, the gray 
areas will be small relative to the noncontroversial portions of 
the category’s coverage. The law’s trajectory has not led to in-
                                                                                    
 166. See Kaplow, supra note 10. 
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coherence: The resemblance of penumbral cases to prototypical 
cases can be expressed using straightforward reasoning with 
comparatively little resort to history. Finally, the goal-derived 
categories provide a way for law to limit at least the most egre-
gious, spirit-violative conduct that otherwise might arguably 
pass muster given how the other types of categories have de-
veloped. Put differently, goal-derived categories backstop the 
other categories, covering what they may miss or cannot feasi-
bly address. And their coverage, too, can be explained 
straightforwardly with little reference to history.  
Thus, ideally, the law would be richer for the push and pull 
between regulators and regulated parties. Statutory gaps are 
filled. Problematic provisions are challenged and refined. Cer-
tainly, one could reasonably expect this trajectory where the 
regulated parties are largely pushing in the same direction and 
the regulators can have a more effective, and more coherent, 
response. This may be the trajectory where the regulated par-
ties are pushing in different directions but are constrained from 
making more formalistic arguments, again likely pushing the 
law’s development in a satisfactory direction. Where statutory 
or regulatory terms derive from ordinary language, and where 
the evolution of the law has not strayed too far from ordinary 
usage, that ordinary meaning may importantly constrain regu-
lated parties from making arguments that push a category into 
incoherence. The path taken—the way in which the law’s cov-
erage develops over time—can work to form a fairly coherent 
whole. One can readily or at least feasibly explain the law’s 
meaning and trajectory by reference to statutory purposes.  
Consider, by contrast, a regime whose trajectory is strongly 
historically contingent in the manner we have described. In a 
regime that needs extensive reference to its trajectory to ex-
plain its coverage, the push and pull between regulators and 
minimal compliers will be quite distant from the ideal, reflect-
ing inconsistencies on both sides. Whatever necessary and suf-
ficient condition categories are present allow for considerable 
spirit-violative behavior. Perhaps more importantly, the scope 
of the prototype-centered categories becomes attenuated and 
more difficult to explain organically; the core is quite small, 
and the resemblance between the core and the cases the cate-
gory comes to encompass can best or only be explained by refe-
rencing the history. Finally, the coverage of the goal-centered 
categories also becomes rather hard to explain except, again, by 
reference to history. Indeed, the goal-derived categories, rather 
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than complementing the other categories, may themselves ei-
ther yield a contradictory set of results or results that are in-
consistent with those of the first two types of categories. In par-
ticular, a category defined by necessary and sufficient condi-
tions, or a prototype-centered category with some sufficient 
conditions, might permit outcomes that the goal-derived cate-
gory would seem to preclude. In sum, the categories may be-
come internally incoherent and may conflict with one another. 
Statutory meaning will become distorted. It will become very 
hard to justify or explain the law by reference to its purpose. 
Any explanation will require reference to the twists and turns 
of the path—the push and the pull.  
  CONCLUSION   
As yet, the ideas and conclusions that we present in this 
Article are quite preliminary. Much work remains to be done to 
evaluate our account by reference to particular regulatory re-
gimes. Tax may or may not prove to be an exceptional case, dif-
ferent in kind from other areas of law. Nevertheless, we believe 
that our theory reflects a certain intuitive logic and offers a co-
herent and plausible explanation for why some regulatory re-
gimes have greater difficulties with efficacy and legitimacy 
than others.  
 
